چکیده:
For almost three decades since the Iranian Revolution of 1979، there has consistently been a conflict between Iran and the United States over a host of issues. The relations between the two countries became more challenging since 2003 after it came to light that Iran had been developing its nuclear program. Since then some US officials have even gone so far as to announce - and repeat - the possibility of a military strike against Iranian facilities to end the nuclear program. In reality، up to now no such drastic action has taken place. Rather instead، in a milder reaction، the US، aided by its European allies and enjoying Russian and Chinese lukewarm acquiescence، has imposed several rounds of sanctions against Iran through the adoption of obligatory resolutions by the United Nations Security Council. But، these actions have failed to force the Iranians to end their program. As a result، many experts argue that a new policy should be pursued toward Iran vis-à-vis its nuclear dossier. So the main challenge which poses itself is to predict when and how this conflict will come to an end. In this paper، different game theory models are used to interpret the current situation of the crisis. It is shown that while at each step it may be more favorable for each party to insist on its claims، the overall result of this approach may not be so favorable for all. As a result، both parties should think about the long term effects of their decisions. It is also shown that the absence of mutual trust could be the main factor that has forced both sides to reach the current point of crisis. Therefore، any attempt towards re-establishing mutual trust between the two governments might be a major step leading to a lasting solution. Furthermore، different possible choices for the US government and the long term effects of each choice will be analyzed. The analysis will also address economic aspects of the conflict، and the long-term effects of any decision and the best possible choices for both governments will be presented.
خلاصه ماشینی:
"(6) However, it was not initially clear whether such an approach meant that the US would accept Iran’s pursuit of its peaceful nuclear activities or it would still continue its policy of pressuring Iran towards terminating package of promises, its program – even if through offering a incentives.
On the other hand, if the US decides to impose more sanctions on Iran, in response Iran may accept the suspension of its nuclear program (with a probability equal to p), again the game terminates and the total cost to the US will be 'c' units.
In the next step if the US accepts a nuclear Iran then its cost reaches: CA = n ×b + a (4) On the other hand, if it presses on for further sanction then the average cost reaches: CD = n ×b + p × c + (1− p) ×a (5) Once again we should use the following decision strategy: Accept > CD C A < Deny (6) Also it results in: Accept > p < Deny a − b (7 c − b The outcome of this game is interesting.
Such a policy would serve to convince other countries that even a civilian nuclear project -as in the case of Iran - would not be acceptable to the United States, which might in turn tend to persuade them to opt for a secret program.
Using game theory models, it was shown that the US acceptance of a nuclear Iran after the country has acquired the technology despite the US opposition and pressures is one solution, but it is the worst possible option for the US Government.