چکیده:
Trust and its implications in international relations in general, and in conditions of longterm conflict and hostility between opposing states, has been the subject of considerable scholarly attention and debate in recent years. This study addresses the issue of trust in shaping U.S.-Iran relations in general, and in affecting a myriad of complex issues and interactions between the two states, including its role in framing direct or multilateral negotiations on the nuclear issue. The paper situates the discussion of trust in the context of international relations theories and examines the divergent views and approaches of both countries towards trust, the extent of their risk taking in “costly signaling”, and both states’ attitudes and behavior while engaging in both “prisoners’ dilemma” and the “assurance game”. It is argued that Iran's approach towards conflict resolution and overcoming the challenge of mistrust is generally driven by its “strategic culture” of being a “security seeker” which favors playing an “assurance game”. The incongruency between the U.S's and Iran's strategic cultures and thus the U.S. tendency towards “prisoners' dilemma” in mistrusting conditions constitutes a foundational obstacle in bilateral and multilateral diplomacy and negotiations between the two countries.The study thus illustrates the complex and significant connection between trust and the U.S. and Iranian strategic cultures, introducing the concept of natural hubris in U.S. foreign policy identity and its ramifications for the dynamics of trust, and finally, what is termed here the effective balance between the two states.
خلاصه ماشینی:
S. -Iran Relations: Between the Prisoners’ Dilemma and the Assurance Game Mohiaddin Mesbahi Abstract Trust and its implications in international relations in general, and in conditions of longterm conflict and hostility between opposing states, has been the subject of considerable scholarly attention and debate in recent years.
S. -Iran relations; trust; natural hubris, prisoners’dilemma; assurance game; strategic culture; ontological security; costly signaling; effective balance; reflexivity Professor at the Department of Politics and International Relations and Director of Middle East Studies at Florida International University, (mesbahim@fiu.
S. policy on Iran’s nuclear program through a widely read seminal article (Waltz 2012), in which he argued that an Iranian bomb will contribute to stability, two other prominent realists, each from different orientations, Mearsheimer and Walt, uncharacteristically focused on the role of domestic factors, the Israeli lobby, in shaping a U.
Andrew Bacevich’s work (Bacevich 2013) points, with a seemingly constructivist take, to a larger and unprecedented transformation of American foreign policy identity, namely its thorough internal and external militarization, and thus the emergence of a new strategic culture ushered in with the victory in the Gulf War, and then institutionalized in the post 9/11 war on terror.
While an explanation of Iran’s conceptual model for understanding international relations and foreign policy behavior, particularly that of the United States, is beyond the scope of this study, suffice it to say that Iran’s lack of trust could be explained through different paradigms, including realism, constructivism, and the critical perspective.