خلاصة:
Karl Popper aimed to present a conception of scientific activity as a rational quest for truth about nature that is in no way reliant on induction. In his view, scientific research is entirely based on deductive inferences, and scientists never resort to inductive support when selecting theories. According to Popper, the stance of scientists toward their theories is one of criticism and falsification, not confirmation and proof; such that by accepting the truth of observational statements and blaming the tested theories against other auxiliary hypotheses for failures in predictions, they seek to falsify scientific theories, and the remaining theories are those that are closer to the truth. In this regard, objections have been raised against Popper, suggesting that the falsificationist methodology will ultimately lead to skepticism. This article aims, firstly, to show that the aforementioned result arises in the shadow of the traditional conception of the concept of knowledge and, secondly, that with a verisimilitude-based conception of the concept of knowledge and a verisimilitude-based reading of falsificationism, some of these flaws can be avoided.
ملخص الجهاز:
According to Popper, the stance of scientists toward their theories is one of criticism and falsification, not confirmation and verification; such that by accepting the truth of observational statements and blaming the tested theories—in contrast to other auxiliary hypotheses—for failures in predictions, they seek to falsify scientific theories, and the remaining theories are those that are closer to the truth.
D) The problem of practical application: Even if the mechanism of falsification could make knowledge of the incorrectness of falsified theories possible for scientists, and what remains after the falsification of incorrect theories are theories that are closer to the truth, nevertheless, Popper's selection criterion does not provide any possibility for the reasonable practical use of scientific theories; because we have no reason to prefer the predictions of non-falsified theories over the alternative falsified theories.
4. The possibility of knowing the falsity of theories with a reliabilist approach to knowledge The failure to provide reasons for accepting the truth of observational sentences and the existence of a multitude of auxiliary sentences during the testing of scientific theories, each in its own turn, deny the possibility that scientists know that the theories falsified by them are incorrect.
Observational sentences are the output of sensory perception processes, and whenever these processes are reliable, scientists will be justified in accepting the truth of observational sentences; however, from Lipton's perspective, reliabilism does not show that scientists know that observational sentences are true; rather, by abandoning justification in the traditional sense and explaining the epistemic connection between experiences and sensory perceptions, it shows how such knowledge is possible (Goldman, 1995, p37).
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