خلاصة:
Apart from the fact that the ‘corporeal body’ is a natural container for the origination and progression of the soul, Sadr al-DīnSīrāzī(1569-1640) distinguishes another ontological level of body, i.e. the ‘imaginal body’,predicated upon the existence of an ontological state of being known as the ‘imaginal’ (mithālī) that mediates between an intelligible and the sensible realms.The ‘imaginal body’ or ‘body of the resurrection’is ‘perceiving’ (mudrik) and ‘living’ (hayy) and contrary to the ‘corporeal body’, is inseparable from the soul and it is through the intermediary function of this ‘imaginal body’ that the human ‘rational soul’ (al-nafs al-nātiqa)presides over the ‘corporeal body’. In fact, Sadr al-Dīn explains the relation between the ‘rational soul’ and the ‘corporeal body’ through two intermediaries, first the‘imaginal body’ and second, the ‘steam/animal spirit’. The ‘steam spirit’ is ontologically closer to the ‘corporeal body’ and the ‘imaginal body’ is ontologically closer to the ‘rational soul’. In other words, the ‘imaginal body’ presides over the ‘corporeal body’ through an intermediate link,i.e. a kind of ‘subtle mass’ known in the Peripatetic philosophy as the ‘steam spirit’.
ملخص الجهاز:
Analysis of the Quiddity and Reality of the Exemplary Body and its Role in Explaining the Relationship between Soul and Body in Mulla Sadra's Philosophy Tahereh Yavari* Hossein Zamaniha** Abstract From Mulla Sadra's perspective, a human being, besides this natural body, which serves as the carrier and substrate for the occurrence and evolution of the soul, possesses another body that is the effect of the soul and posterior to it.
Mulla Sadra's critique of the reasoning of the Sheikh of Illumination and his commentators in proving the existence of a separate world of images through the perception of massive forms and the impossibility of the impression of the great in the small is that he considers this reasoning incomplete and points to two fundamental objections present in this argument: first, the faculty of imagination is not a material matter, so we cannot say that the impossibility of these forms in the faculty of imagination is impossible due to the impossibility of the impression of the great in the small; and second, the subsistence of these forms to the soul and the faculty of imagination is an emanationist subsistence rather than an immanent one (Mulla Sadra 1999: Vol. 9, 191; ibid: Vol. 8, 180).
However, it is only at this level of abstraction and with the emergence of the imaginal body that the soul finds an essential and immediate connection with a body that is a requirement for the existence of the soul and, in Mulla Sadra's expression, the shadow of the soul (ibid: Vol. 9, 31); otherwise, in his view, the natural body is merely a carrier and a substrate for the formation and evolution of the soul, and the soul's control over it is not primary or essential.