خلاصة:
The distinction between essential primary predication and common artificial predication is one of the most important innovations of Muslim logicians, which was explicitly proposed and employed for the first time in the works of Allama Duwani, and subsequent logicians such as Mulla Sadra and others have benefited from this distinction in solving many logical and philosophical problems. Despite this, the distinction was implicitly raised in the works of Aristotle, Farabi, Ibn Sina, and others, and surprisingly, it was opposed to essential primary predication. This article, by examining logical works in the periods before and after Allama Duwani, has found five logical and non-logical (reason and cause) reasons for opposing primary predication in the works of the first period; without responding to these reasons, moving out of the paradigm of the first period and entering the paradigm of the second period does not seem very likely. Qutb al-Din al-Razi and Qushji from the first period, and Duwani from the second period, are three logicians who, by responding to these five reasons, were able to create a turning point in Islamic logic and bring essential primary predication out of the depths of neglect and turn it into an important axis in solving philosophical problems.
ملخص الجهاز:
Qutb al-Din al-Razi and Qushji from the first period, and Dawani from the second period, are three logicians who, by responding to these five arguments, were able to create a turning point in Islamic logic, bring essential primary predication out of the depths of neglect, and turn it into an important axis in solving philosophical problems.
Another theory that lies behind the author's observations, through which they have studied the books of ancient logicians, is Faramarz Gharamaleki's claim that he considers primary essential predication to be equivalent to this identity, and common artificial predication to be equivalent to other types of predication: In primary predication, the proposition does not essentially involve membership and inclusion, but rather involves identity in the terminology of modern logic (Ibid, From Natural Predication to Second-Degree Predicate, p.
Qutb Shirazi Qutb al-Din al-Shirazi (417-436 AH), like Aristotle and al-Farabi (and unlike Avicenna and Khwaja Nasir), uses primary predication in particular propositions, although he attributes the core matter to Avicenna: Two real particulars cannot be predicated of one another; for one cannot say that Zayd is Amr unless they were two names for one person, and then the concept of both would be one, so the predication and designation would not be according to reality [-common predication] but according to speech and tongue [-predication primary predication], as the Sheikh said, and knowing that it is impossible for a real particular to be a predicate by nature, since a predicate is a description of a subject and an individual cannot be a description.
(
, 
, 
)
