خلاصة:
One of the most important factors that can help the development of the Islamic financial system is creating interest in Islamic financial instruments in order to be a complete replacement for conventional financial instruments. Reduce agency costs in Islamic financial instruments in comparison to conventional instruments is necessary to create the attraction and development of Islamic financial system. In this paper، based on game theory and agency theory، we assess Ijarah and Musharakah Sukuk in terms of agency costs. In recent years the use of agency theory have risen sharply as a branch of game theory to analyze the capital structure of financial contracts; Asymmetric information and moral hazard are the most important issues in financial contracts that led some financial contracts are not attractive. The results show that entrepreneur (contractor) is indifferent on the mode of financing agreement. However، Ijarah sukuk is considered a more appropriate tool in financing by investors because it imposes a lower agency costs.
ملخص الجهاز:
In the following research, using game theory, the contractual relationships between financiers (employer) and the issuer (agent) in Ijarah and Musharakah Sukuk are examined, and based on the "Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium" solution, the optimal contract coordinates that minimize agency costs are extracted for both types of Sukuk; then, the two types of Sukuk are compared based on these costs.
Research Background Although numerous articles have addressed discussions related to moral hazard and adverse selection in Islamic financial contracts and compared them with usurious financial instruments; however, less attention has been paid to optimizing financial security methods based on game theory and agency theory.
Research Method In the following article, game theory and the Nash equilibrium solution of a complete subgame are used to predict the behavior of the sponsor and the investor in the principal-agent model.
Figure 3: Basic agent-principal game for Musharakah Sukuk / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / If we denote the expected return from maximum effort as E(PH) and the expected return from low effort as E(PL), the sponsor's incentive-compatibility constraint will be in the form of relationship five.
Based on the theoretical model from game theory, we showed that the existence of personal interests and asymmetric information can increase moral hazard, and we showed that the investor (principal) can prepare and regulate the contract in such a way that agency costs are reduced as much as possible.
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