خلاصة:
Although abortion is considered a reprehensible and abominable act in sacred law and human societies, in cases of conflict between the mother's health and the fetus's life, from the perspective of many jurists, the mother is free to choose to preserve her own health. Despite the permission for the act of abortion, civil liability related to abortion treatment is one of the issues raised. In this matter, the legislator, following some opinions of great scholars, has ruled for the fall of guarantee (liability). Examining the implications of the narrations regarding the blood money (diya) for the abortion of a fetus is one of the very sensitive and difficult points of this discussion. The method of taking implications and accepting or rejecting the implications of conditions in these narrations is one of the major influential topics in the significance of these evidences. By examining the appearance of the evidences, sufficient certainty for taking the implications from these narrations is not obtained. Although their lack of significance is also not reassuring, the lack of appearance is sufficient for non-proof. The only reason is the practical principle of Istishab and Bara'at, which determines the primary principle in the discussion of blood money and guarantees. This principle can be the reason for proving the lack of liability resulting from abortion treatment.
ملخص الجهاز:
Civil Liability of Therapeutic Abortion * Reza Poursedghi ** Hassanali Ali Akbarian Abstract Although fetal abortion is considered a reprehensible and abominable act in the Holy Law and human societies, in cases of conflict between the mother's health and the life of the fetus, from the perspective of many jurists, the mother is free to choose to preserve her own health.
Although this issue is mentioned in Article 718 of the Islamic Penal Code and ultimately follows the view of non-liability; however, considering the multitude of jurists who believe in the necessity of paying the blood money, and the fact that on the other hand, almost no jurist has explicitly stated the absence of liability, the conformity of the legislator's ruling with religious rulings is subject to relative doubt.
1. The correlation between the ruling of permissibility and the exemption from blood money (diya) It might be concluded by citing certain cases in jurisprudence that whenever an act is performed with a legal Sharia permit, no responsibility arises from that act against the person.
In any case, this discussion requires more space, but it can be claimed to this extent that if Sharia permissibility arises from secondary titles such as harm and necessity, there is certainly no correlation between permissibility and the absence of liability; because the evidence does not indicate more than the lifting of a taklifi (obligatory) ruling.
317) According to this view, in a case where abortion has been ruled permissible due to necessity, the fetus has no blood money.
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