خلاصة:
In the works of Ibn Sina, expressions related to the discussion of will are phrased in a way that allows for two interpretations. Some researchers believe that Ibn Sina considers the attribute of will to be verbally common between the Necessary Being (God) and humanity. In contrast, others argue that he views this attribute as semantically common. Examination of Ibn Sina's works indicates that his expressions, in cases such as the following, have laid the groundwork for the interpretation of verbal commonality: (1) the absence of conceptual conflict in divine attributes, especially knowledge and will; (2) the distinction of will in the Necessary Being and humanity. On the other hand, his expressions regarding the division of will and the comparison of will in humans and the Necessary Being provide the basis for interpreting semantic commonality. It seems plausible to consider Ibn Sina's theory as semantic commonality and, relying on his expressions about will and divine attributes, present an interpretation of evidence supporting verbal commonality. Examining Ibn Sina's works allows us to define will as "a quality in the agent of the world that causes the issuance of an action from him." In this case, the will between God and humans will be semantically common. Within such a definition, the distinction between the will of God and the will of humans will be merely an extensional difference.
ملخص الجهاز:
Attention to Avicenna's works shows that his expressions in cases such as the following have created a basis for an equivocal reading: (1) the lack of conceptual divergence among divine attributes, especially the attributes of knowledge and will; (2) the distinction of will in the Necessary Exalted and humans.
It seems possible to consider Avicenna's theory as one of shared meaning and, by citing his expressions regarding will and divine attributes, provide an interpretation of the evidence referring to equivocation.
In this article, after considering the background of the research, first, evidence from Avicenna's works that indicates the shared meaning of "will" between the Necessary Exalted and humans is analyzed.
Thus, it can be said that this expression is evidence of the shared meaning of will between humans and God. In the Metaphysics of the Alai Encyclopedia, Avicenna has divided the Persian equivalent of will, namely 'khast' (desire/will), into desire accompanied by knowledge, desire accompanied by conjecture, and desire accompanied by imagination.
In In this section, first the differences between the will of humans and the will of the Necessary Exalted are presented, and then the lack of conceptual divergence between divine attributes is discussed as evidence for the verbal sharing of will.
In a similar expression from Ilahiyyat al-Shifa, Najat, and Mabda wa Ma'ad, the intelligible reality that exists with the Necessary Exalted is considered to be the same as knowledge, power, and will (Avicenna, 1404b: 403; 1379: 651; 1363: 76).