خلاصة:
The question of this paper is the relationship between motion and time. Though philosophical debates are intrinsically difficult، the entanglement of the two concepts of motion and time، and the fact that they are mixed with nothingness، add to the complexity of this relationship and has put it in a hollow of ambiguity. In the discussion of motion، Avicenna، by denying the existence of the external existence of the definite motion، defends the mediated motion as the external reality of motion. But Mulla Sadra، according to his theory of substantial motion، argues for the objectivity of the definite motion. Avicenna considers the time، following the motion، of the accidentals of the body، so he presents it in the physics. But Mulla Sadra regards time as the amount of motion in the substance، that is، the universe is constantly in motion، change and regeneration، and time is the amount of this regeneration and change in the nature. Sadra considers time as the predicate of analytical accidental and a philosophical secondary concept. For Avicenna، time never corresponds with the mediated motion، as the external reality of motion; instead it corresponds with the regenerative and discontinuous proportions of the uniform motion of the heavens. But، according to Sadra، the definite motion، as the objective truth of motion، is the very regeneration and elapsing، and it has a total correspondence with time.
ملخص الجهاز:
For Avicenna, motion is one of the conditions of the physical world; however, unlike Mulla Sadra, it is by no means a dimension of nature and material existents and does not penetrate the realm of their identity and reality; therefore, motion is not derived from the analysis of a material entity and is not a second intelligible; because this motion is external to the essence of things and is a necessary accident and an incidental predicate; thus, its existence, like other accidents, is in need of a subject and has a relational existence.
For Mulla Sadra, motion is not the connecting point between the fixed and variable levels of existence, and since motion is the mode of existence of renewing nature and an intrinsic matter, contrary to Avicenna's view, no aspect of stability is detectable in it; because its identity is the very essence of change; therefore, Mulla Sadra cannot accept the image of motion as a made thing as its external reality and consider the reality of motion to be a stable and fixed state that has renewed relations between the beginning and the end; because the essence of motion is made renewed and its identity is the very essence of change.
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