خلاصة:
In epistemic analysis, the concept of 'justification' has received serious attention from epistemologists. Whether justification is actually internal to knowledge, or is one of its necessary or sufficient conditions, or fundamentally plays no role in epistemic analysis, each of these positions has claimed its own theories and thus presented their own reformist views regarding knowledge. All these efforts have been made to distinguish true instances of knowledge from non-knowledge. In this context, besides the title of justification, other titles such as 'analysis of justification' and 'factors of justification' have also been considered by thinkers and, naturally, have left a significant impact on discussions related to knowledge. In this writing, an attempt has been made to provide a brief overview of these views and compare their characteristics with one another.
ملخص الجهاز:
The important difference between these two, from Alston's perspective, is that the justification of a belief is the organization of multiple observations in its confirmation, whereas in the being justified of person S in believing proposition P, performing any reasoning activity regarding P is not necessary (Alston, 1991, 71).
(23) It is worth mentioning that opponents of evidentialism believe that what evidentialists consider the condition for the realization of knowledge (namely, the necessity of knowledge possessing a reason), is not necessary to prevent being afflicted by epistemic luck; rather, what is necessary to invalidate epistemic luck is the connection between the belief and the mental process that brought that belief about.
For example, evidentialists who believe in +JTB, in response to this question, mention justification based on reason along with a condition or conditions that prevent a justified true belief from falling into the Gettier problem.
The reliabilist approach in solving the Gettier problem has been presented in two different ways: The first method: The reliability of cognitive processes is a condition for the justification of belief (not a fourth condition in the analysis of knowledge).
In the third edition of his book, he writes in Epistemology(53): If a person S, in believing a certain matter, possesses internal justification, in this case, they have knowledge resulting from reflection and observation of their own mental state ( Chisholm,1989,7 ).
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