خلاصة:
In this article, relying on the views of Beall and Restall, we will examine the theory of pluralism in logic. First, we will explain the theories of logical monism, logical relativism, various types of logical pluralism, as well as the difference between Beall and Restall's pluralism compared to other logical pluralist theories. We will explain that Beall and Restall believe in a type of semantic logical pluralism based on which different and acceptable interpretations of the word 'case' in Tarski's definition of validity can be provided. On the other hand, Beall and Restall also believe in the normativity of logic. Based on this view, logical validity possesses normative consequences for evaluating arguments in natural language. The claim of the present article is that the recent position of Beall and Restall contradicts their pluralism, in such a way that it converts their pluralism into logical monism. Discussion and investigation regarding different versions of the idea of the normativity of logic is a topic that has received less attention in the field of discussions related to logical pluralism. In this article, by relying on the teachings that we will present regarding these versions of the normativity of logic, we will proceed to critique and examine the logical pluralism of Beall and Restall.
ملخص الجهاز:
We will explain that Bell and Restall believe in a type of semantic logical pluralism based on which different and acceptable interpretations of the word "case" in Tarski's definition of truth can be provided.
The value of validity or logical consequence as a norm for reasoning and also for evaluating it is, according to many philosophers (besides Beall and Restall in this regard, see also (Caret, 2017: 744) and (Keefe, 2014: 1385)), due to the fact that, on one hand, the ultimate goal of our epistemological activities is belief in true (and not false) propositions, and on the other hand, the validity of an argument, by definition, guarantees the truth of the conclusion in cases where the premises are true.
The idea of the truth-preserving nature of a valid argument, in addition to the first point; namely, that we intuitively consider our epistemological activities as an effort to adopt true (and not false) beliefs, explains Beall and Restall's claim regarding the normativity of logic.
Suppose that L1 and L2 are two logics that provide different but acceptable instances of GTT regarding the concept of validity according to Beall and Restall (for example, classical logic and relevance logic) and therefore, based on the idea of non-priority, they have no priority over each other for formalizing natural language arguments.
An important and interpretive point of the authors is this claim: that the collapse argument can be reconstructed based on newer versions of the normativity of logic in such a way that it contradicts Beall and Restall's pluralism.
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