خلاصة:
This article examines and analyzes the Fatah al-Mubin operation using the available documents and books, and discovers and presents the truth of the Fatah al-Mubin operation as much as possible by drawing the line and criteria of the basic principles and rules of war accepted by military experts. Iraqi Army operation in the Chazzabeh Strait on February 6, 1981 with the aim of preventing or delaying the future operation of Iranian and its disruptive operations in western Shush and Reqabiyah on March 19 and 20, 1981 with the aim of disrupting the organization and destroying part of the Iranian forces to delay the operation could not prevent the operation. However, to some extent, it was able to delay the implementation of the operation and inflict casualties and damages on the units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Iraq, for secure reasons, had discovered almost the entire Fatah al-Mubin operation except in the area of the Quds base (Aynkhosh) and was fully prepared to confront the Islamic fighters. The central camp of Karbala, with its four joint bases, subordinated, with surprise, provided the heights of Aynkhosh, Tineh, Barqazeh, Reqabiyah and Mishdagh. The Quds base as the main effort in the Eynkhosh axis, the Nasr base in the west axis of the Naderi Bridge, the Fajr base in the Shush axis, and the Fatah base in the Reqabiyah axis had attacted. This operation achieved all its planned goals and 2400 square kilometers of the most sensitive areas of Khuzestan were liberated by Islamic fighters and more than 25 thousand Iraqi forces were killed and wounded and more than 16 thousand of them were captured by Islamic fighters. The enthusiasm of the youth and the courage in breaking the line by the IRGC and Basij Forces and their maturity and also the facilities of combat support and support of combat services of the army, made the operation of Fatah al-Mubin successful. The audacity in planning and carrying out operation Fath al-Mubin, regardless of the conventional martial art and the invention of a new method and style in planning and conducting operations, caused the surprises enemy. So, implements of sophisticated night battle tactics, attacks from the unexpected side of the enemy, change and flexibility in planning and implementation of operations according to the necessity of the battle zone, insistence of the forces and commanders on the victory and the proper and timely use of the enemy's weaknesses and vulnerabilities have been the main causes and factors of victory in Fatah al-Mubin operation.
ملخص الجهاز:
3- Mission: The Karbala 2 Operations Command (Karbala Central Headquarters) will launch a raid at (time) on (day) for the purpose of destroying enemy forces in the Dezful and Shush regions, capturing and securing the Ali Gereh Zod, Abu Sulaybi - Khat, Ruqabiyah Gorge, Chaneh heights, and Ein Khosh, and establishing a defensive area in the region, and stands ready to continue the raid towards the west to secure the border line upon orders.
Initial Dual Plans: Similar to the operation of October 15, 1980, the Army intended to place the main effort from the direction of Naderi Bridge and on the Dehlaran and Fakeh roads; in this plan, the operation would be carried out in two stages; in the stage 332 The enemy forces' assault in the areas of the Fajr and Fath headquarters during this disruptive raid caused several passages of these headquarters to be discovered by the enemy, eliminating the possibility of surprise in these areas; however, besides being able to damage two battalions of the Islamic Corps, the enemy achieved nothing and was only able to station itself near the Islamic forces and, on the morning of March 19, 1982, deployed a large number of tanks in the Ruqabiyah Gorge.
Considering the statements of Iraqi prisoners, documents, and books by Iraqi authors, the execution of disruptive raids by the Iraqi army in the two regions of Shush and Ruqabiyah, Saddam's presence in the Barqaza region (the Fourth Corps headquarters), and the concentration of major Iraqi units in the area, it seems that Iraq had discovered almost the entire Fath ol-Mobin operation except for the Quds headquarters area (Ein Khosh) and was fully prepared to confront the Islamic warriors.