خلاصة:
A contract is incomplete if some of its aspects are not specified or if its execution is not possible without cost. In the complex and uncertain economic environment, banking and financial contracts are usually incomplete. The incompleteness of a contract causes a reduction in its effectiveness. The aim of this study is to examine the requirements of the country's banking contracts from the perspective of incompleteness in contracts. This study will analyze the role of various factors creating incompleteness in contracts on the performance of the country's banking contracts. Results of this research show that the country's banking contracts are incomplete due to the unprovability of contracts, high transaction costs, uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity in contracts, which leads to the incomplete execution of obligations and the formation of opportunistic conditions and the problem of hold-up in the country's banking contracts. Consequently, it is necessary to design mechanisms to compensate for incompleteness in contracts. Given the incomplete implementation of customer screening in the country's banking system, it seems that the best mechanism to compensate for incompleteness in contracts is to increase the correlation between the bank and the customer in the form of a relationship-oriented banking pattern, which can reduce the problems caused by incompleteness in contracts.
ملخص الجهاز:
What this research seeks is not actually the denial or rejection of other reasons for creating non-performing facilities, the formalization of contracts, or other contractual problems; rather, it is an institutional and structural look at these kinds of issues in the banking system and their consequences, and to provide solutions for them, which has not been addressed in almost any of the studies conducted regarding the relationship between banks and facility recipients in the country.
This evidence provided from the legal, judicial, regulatory, and legislative structure governing the country's banking, and other such matters, shows that banking operations in our country have a high risk in the area of facilities and their repayment, and opportunistic conditions for customers in facility granting contracts are available, just as Iran's judicial courts are full of multi-year cases where banks and financial institutions have not succeeded in collecting their claims and are still pursuing them.
The hold-up problem and opportunism in the Iranian banking system In the Iranian economy as well, due to the existence of factors that create defects in contracts, such as the non-verifiability of contracts, ambiguity in contracts, transaction costs, complexity, and high uncertainty in banks' credit facility contracts, in practice, most banking contracts are incomplete, which leads to the bank being held up in unverifiable contracts and results in opportunistic behavior by customers (facility recipients).
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