خلاصة:
This study examines the impact of stock illiquidity on managerial short-termism at listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange. In this regard, 124 companies were evaluated for the period 2005-2013. We used Amihud (2002) criterion to measure illiquidity shares, and to measure the managerial myopia, abnormal real operations and real earnings management were used. The approach combines data used to test the hypotheses. The results of the testing indicated that the illiquidity has a significant and positive impact on abnormal real operations. This means that with an increase in liquidity risk, abnormal real operations are more likely to increase. The results showed a significant difference between the discretionary accruals and real earnings management in the impact on the illiquidity. This study follows the Gunny (2010), and Roychowdhury (2006) suspect firmm - years approach to address firms’ use of deviation from real operating for real earnings management purposes. The results showed that companies with high illiquidity experience real earnings management in the current year.
ملخص الجهاز:
To measure stock illiquidity, the Amihud (2002) measure was used, and to measure managerial myopia, indices of deviation from real operating activities and real earnings management were employed.
The results of the hypothesis testing showed that stock illiquidity has a positive and significant effect on the deviation from real operating activities.
Furthermore, in the present study, in accordance with the research of Gani (2010) and Roychoudhury (2006), a year-firm approach for companies suspected of earnings management was used to identify companies whose deviation from real activities was for the purpose of real earnings management, and the results showed that companies with high illiquidity experience increasing real earnings management in the current year.
In particular, the results of the present study suggest that laws and regulations aimed at improving liquidity may have an effective impact on the quality of financial reporting and real investment decisions by discouraging earnings management methods.
Theoretical foundations have criticisms regarding the direct use of models to evaluate the level of abnormal real activities of a company as a criterion for earnings management, because without considering managerial incentives, these indicators may excessively include other behaviors besides intentional earnings manipulation.
In summary, the hypotheses of this research are as follows: Main Hypothesis 1: Stock illiquidity has an effect on managerial myopia (deviation from real operating activities).
Main Hypothesis 2: Stock illiquidity has an effect on managerial myopia (increasing real earnings management).
To measure illiquidity, the Amihud (2002) criterion was used, and to estimate the level of managerial myopia, the real operating activities model and real earnings management were used.
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