خلاصة:
The subject of this writing is to explain the problematic nature of the issue of predestination and free will in Attar's thought; that is, why in some of his poems we explicitly encounter determinism where any will and power is stripped from humans, but conversely, many of his poems cannot be understood without the human being having free will. In an attempt to explain this conflict, it was concluded that the main origin is actually the conflict between two levels: theory and practice; those poems of Attar that refer to theoretical discussions, especially based on his theological-mystical foundations of God-knowledge—particularly the formulation derived from the uncaused nature of God, absolute agency, and divine decree and destiny—lead to pure determinism. However, this determinism has implications that are inconsistent with moral and behavioral recommendations, religious duties, human teachability, the guidance of prophets, and moral responsibility, rendering them empty of importance and meaning, even though their fundamental presupposition is human free will; whereas Attar, in poems referring to practical matters, mystical journeying (Sair-o-Suluk), moral recommendations, religious commands and prohibitions, and encouragement to struggles and obedience, emphasizes these matters. At the same time, we showed that although Attar, while admitting his inability to provide a rational solution, attempts to bring justifications such as the combination of divine attraction and human effort to resolve this inconsistency, he is not successful. Finally, we have referred to some other moral implications of Attar's determinism regarding the nature of moral concepts.
ملخص الجهاز:
In many poems that pertain to practical mysticism, Attar deals with behavioral and moral recommendations and invitations; he speaks words to incite and encourage audiences toward struggle (Mujahadat) and worship, shows attention to adherence to religious commands and prohibitions, emphasizes human education and upbringing, speaks of the importance and value of the guidance of prophets, and raises the issues of moral responsibility, praise and blame, and the punishment and reward of actions, all of which fundamentally assume a type of free will for humans.
In their view, free will is the foundation and fundamental assumption of ethics; such that without free will, moral rulings and evaluations, commands and prohibitions, obligation and commitment, and duty, 86 / The contradiction of "theory and action" in the issue of "predestination and free will" in the thought of Attar Nishapuri the possibility of moral conduct and the attainment of practical and moral perfections, moral praise or blame, reward or punishment, and overall moral responsibility and the subject of ethics, would be meaningless and groundless.
Here, Attar can be considered an adherent of this Ash'ari view, in which God is called "The Uncaused Presence," meaning His actions are free from benefit, loss, and causal relationships; Truth acts only according to the requirement of His will, and no matter outside of it, such as the principle of causality, plays a role in it (Kalabadi, 1371: 51; Mustamli Bukhari, 1390, Vol. 2: 482; Shafiei Kodkani, Commentaries on Mantiq al-Tayr, 608).
(
, 
, 
)
