خلاصة:
The research program of 'constitutional economics' began in the 1970s by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock with the book The Calculus of Consent; the logical foundations of constitutional democracy, and reached its peak and prosperity in the 1990s. This new branch of economics is based on the assumptions of individualism and rational choice and attempts to examine the potential consequences of various constitutional rules by employing the standard analytical methods in conventional economics and using analytical models such as price theory and game theory. The present article introduces this research program and points out its application in constitutional engineering. Because despite the importance of constitutional engineering, unfortunately, constitutional law theory has not yet addressed the issue of constitutional engineering from the perspective of the potential consequences of various constitutional rules on political and economic life. Constitutional engineering requires an analytical model that can predict political behaviors as well as individuals' reactions to constitutional rules. Constitutional economics provides a suitable analytical model in this regard.
ملخص الجهاز:
Examining the Foundations and Tools of "Constitutional Economics" and its Application in Constitutional Engineering Date of Receipt: 2010/04/26 Date of Approval: 2011/04/17 Abbasali Kadkhodaei{P1P} Associate Professor, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran Moslem Aghaei-Toogh{P2P} PhD Student in Public Law, University of Tehran Abstract {IBThe research program of "Constitutional Economics" began in the 1970s by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock{P3P} with the book "The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy," and reached its peak and prosperity in the 1990s.
This new branch of economics is based on the assumptions of individualism and rational choice and attempts to examine the potential consequences of various constitutional rules by employing the analytical methods common in conventional economics and using analytical models such as price theory and game theory.
This is because, despite the importance of constitutional engineering, unfortunately, constitutional law theory has not yet addressed the issue of constitutional engineering from the perspective of the potential consequences of various constitutional rules on political and economic life.
For this reason, in the 1970s, a group of economists, utilizing the methodology of economic science, addressed topics that generally fall within the realm of constitutional law theory, such as political legitimacy, voting, elections, decentralization, and federalism.
Like Wicksell, Buchanan and Tullock also proposed "consensus"{P2P} in their book as the main rule for measuring the legitimacy of collective choices and thereafter proceeded to examine the issue of choosing constitutional rules{P3P} using economic analytical methods, which was unprecedented before that.
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