Abstract:
اﻳﻦ ﻣﻘﺎﻟﻪ ﺑﻪ ﻣﺒﺤﺚ ﺗﻌﺮﻳﻒ در ﻧﻈﺎم ﻣﻨﻄﻖ ﺳﻨﺘﻲ ﻣﻲﭘﺮدازد و ﺗـﻼش ﻣـﻲﻛﻨـﺪ ﺑـﺎ ﺑﻴـﺎن اﻧﺘﻘﺎدﻫﺎی وارد ﺑﺮ اﻳﻦ ﻧﻈﺎم و ﻃﺒﻘﻪﺑﻨﺪی و ﺗﺤﻠﻴﻞ آﻧﻬﺎ ﻧﻘﺎط ﺿﻌﻒ و ﻧﺎﻛﺎرآﻣـﺪی ﻣﺒﺤـﺚ ﺗﻌﺮﻳﻒ را ﻧﺸﺎن دﻫﺪ و ﺑﺮ آن اﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﺑﺨﺶ ﺗﻌﺮﻳﻒ در ﻣﻨﻄﻖ ﺳﻨﺘﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺠﻤﻠﻪ ﻣﺒﺤﺜـﻲ ﺑﻲﺛﻤﺮ اﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ ﻧﻪ ﺑﻪ ﻛﺎر ﺗﺤﺼﻴﻞ ﺗﻌﺎرﻳﻒ ﺟﺪﻳﺪ ﻣﻲآﻳﺪ و ﻧﻪ ﻣﻲﺗﻮاﻧﺪ ﺗﻌﺎرﻳﻒ داﻧﺸﻤﻨﺪان را در ﻋﻠﻮم ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ در ﺧﻮد ﺟﺎی داده و ﺗﺤﻠﻴﻞ و ﺑﺮرﺳـﻲ ﻛﻨـﺪ. ﭘـﺲ از ﻧﻘـﺪ اﻳـﻦ ﻧﻈـﺎم ﺗﻼش ﻛﺮدهاﻳﻢ ﺷﻴﻮهای ﺟﺎﻳﮕﺰﻳﻦ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﻲ ﻛﻨﻴﻢ ﻛﻪ در آن ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋﺎ ﭘﻨﺞ ﻧﻮع ﺗﻌﺮﻳﻒ ﻣﻄﺮح ﻣﻲﺷﻮد. ﺳﭙﺲ ﺳﻌﻲ ﺷﺪه اﺳـﺖ وﺟـﻮه رﺟﺤـﺎن و ﻛـﺎرآﻳﻲ ﻧﻈـﺎم ﺟﺪﻳـﺪ ﻣـﻮرد ﺑﺮرﺳـﻲ ﻗﺮارﮔﻴﺮد.
Actualism is an ontological thesis according to which the domain of
existent objects and the domain of actual ones are the same. According to
this thesis, we do not need to commit to any non-actual objects for solving
any philosophical problems. The approach of Bernard Linsky, Edward N.
Zalta and Michael Nelson is one of the current approaches to the actualism
which is known as "New Actualism". They offer a new presupposition
about existent objects according to which a concrete object is in fact
contingently concrete object and a non-concrete object, if not be (unlike the
number 11) an abstract one is (like the Masaya’s child) contingently non-
concrete object. So, by supposing contingently non-concrete objects, they
can present a model with fixed domain and not-world-restricted quantifiers
which can validate formulas like Barcan Formula, Conversion of Barcan
Formula, Necessary Existence and Iterated Modality and offer a suitable
explanation for intuitions which support the formula of Possibility of
Aliens. However, some critics like Karen Bennett believe that in this
approach, some non-actual entities have enumerated as actual objects and
consequently New Actualism is a kind of Proxy Actualism. In this article, by
adopting an opponent position to Karen Bennett’s one, we try to describe
New Actualism and some criticisms about it and to show that New
Actualism is not a kind of Proxy Actualism.
Machine summary:
" ﺷﺎﻳﺪ در ﭘﺎﺳﺦ اﻳﻦ ﻧﻘﺪ ﮔﻔﺘﻪ ﺷﻮد ﻛﻪ ﭼﻨﻴﻦ ﻧﻘﺪی ﺗﺨﺼﺼﺎ از ﺑﺤﺚ ﺧﺎرج اﺳﺖ ﭼﺮا ﻛـﻪ ﭼﻨـﻴﻦ ﺗﻌﺮﻳﻔـﻲ اﺳﺎﺳﺎ ﺗﻌﺮﻳﻒ ﻣﻨﻄﻘﻲ ﻧﻴﺴﺖ ﺗﺎ اﻳﻨﻜﻪ در ﻣﻮرد دﺧﻮﻟﺶ در اﻗﺴﺎم ﭼﻬﺎرﮔﺎﻧﻪ ﻳﺎ ﺧﺮوﺟﺶ از آﻧﻬﺎ ﺳﺨﻦ ﺑﮕﻮﻳﻴﻢ.
در اﻳـﻦ ﻣﻮارد ﻧﻴﺰ ﮔﻔﺘﻪ ﺷﺪه اﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ آﻧﭽﻪ ﻣﻌﺮﱢف واﻗﻊ ﻣﻲﺷﻮد، ﻋﻴﻦ، ﺷﺒﻴﻪ ﻳﺎ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﻧﻴﺴﺖ، ﺑﻠﻜﻪ از ﻣﻘﺎﻳﺴﻪ ﺷـﻲء ﺑﺎ اﻣﻮر ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﻳﺎ ﺷﺒﻴﻪ ﺑﻪ آن ﻣﻔﺎﻫﻴﻤﻲ اﻧﺘﺰاع ﻣﻲﺷﻮد ﻛﻪ از اﻋﺮاض ﺷﻲء ﻣﺤﺴﻮب ﻣﻲﺷﻮﻧﺪ، ﻟـﺬا ﺗﻌﺮﻳـﻒ از ﻣﻮﺳﻲ ﻣﻼﻳﺮی )(Moussa Malayeri ﻃﺮﻳﻖ آﻧﻬﺎ ﺗﻌﺮﻳﻒ رﺳﻤﻲ ﺧﻮاﻫﺪ ﺑﻮد )ﻫﻤﺎن؛ ﻫﻤﺎن، ص 113(.
ﻣﻤﻜﻦ اﺳﺖ ﭘﻴﺸﻨﻬﺎدی ﺑﻪ ﻋﻨﻮان ﭘﺎﺳﺦ در اﻳﻦ ﺟﺎ ﻣﻄﺮح ﺷﻮد، ﺑـﺪﻳﻦ ﺗﺮﺗﻴـﺐ ﻛـﻪ اﮔﺮﭼـﻪ اﻣـﻮر ﻣـﺬﻛﻮر ﻣﺎﻫﻮی ﻧﻴﺴﺘﻨﺪ، اﻣﺎ ﻣﻲﺗﻮان آﻧﻬﺎ را ﺑﻪ اﻣﻮر ﻣﺎﻫﻮی ﺷﺒﻴﻪ داﻧﺴﺖ و ﻫﻤﺎﻧﻨﺪ آﻧﻬﺎ ﺗﻌﺮﻳـﻒ ﻛـﺮد، ﭼـﺮا ﻛـﻪ ﻫـﺮ ﺷﻲء ﻋﻼوه ﺑﺮ اﻳﻨﻜﻪ دارای اﺟﺰاﺋﻲ اﺻﻠﻲ و ﻣﻘﻮم اﺳﺖ، دارای اﻣﻮری ﻓﺮﻋﻲ ﻧﻴﺰ ﻫﺴﺖ ﻛﻪ ﻣﻲﺗﻮان آﻧﻬـﺎ را ﺑﻪ ﻣﻨﺰﻟﻪ ذاﺗﻴﺎت و ﻋﻮارض ﺧﺎص آن ﺷﻲء ﺑﻪ ﺣﺴﺎب آورد، ﺑﺪﻳﻦ ﺗﺮﺗﻴﺐ اراﺋﻪ ﺗﻌـﺎرﻳﻒ ﺣـﺪی و رﺳـﻤﻲ در ﺧﺼﻮص آﻧﻬﺎ ﻣﻨﻌﻲ ﻧﺪارد.
ﺟﺮﺟﺎﻧﻲ در ﺣﻮاﺷﻲ ﺷﺮح ﺷﻤﺴﻴﻪ – ﺑﺮ ﺧﻼف ﻧﻈﺮ ﻛﺎﺗﺒﻲ ﺻﺎﺣﺐ رﺳﺎﻟﻪ ﺷﻤﺴﻴﻪ - ﺷﺮط ﺗﺴﺎوی ﻣﻌـﺮﱢف و ﻣﻌﺮﱠف را ﺑﻪ ﻣﺘﺄﺧﺮان ﻧﺴﺒﺖ ﻣﻲدﻫﺪ و ﺑﺮ آن اﺳﺖ ﻛﻪ اﻳﻦ ﺷﺮط ﻧﺰد ﻣﺘﻘﺪﻣﺎن ﻣﻄﺮح ﻧﺒﻮده اﺳـﺖ؛ وی در ﺧﺼﻮص ﺟﻮاز ﺗﻌﺮﻳﻒ ﺑﻪ اﻋﻢ ﻣﻲﮔﻮﻳﺪ: »ﻣﻤﻜﻦ ﻧﻴﺴﺖ ﺑﺘﻮان ﺷﻴﺌﻲ را ﺗﺼﻮر ﻛﺮد، ﻣﮕﺮ آﻧﻜﻪ آن را دﺳﺖ ﻛﻢ از ﺑﺮﺧﻲ از اﺷﻴﺎء ﻣﺘﻤﺎﻳﺰ ﻛﻨﻴﻢ؛ اﻣﺎ ﺑﺮای ﺗﺼﻮر ﺷـﻲء ﺗﻤـﺎﻳﺰ آن از ﺟﻤﻴـﻊ اﻏﻴـﺎر ﻻزم ﺑـﻪ ﻧﻈـﺮ ﻧﻤـﻲرﺳـﺪ« )ﺟﺮﺟﺎﻧﻲ، 3631، ص 87(."