چکیده:
his paper studies technology adoption in a duopoly where the unbiased technological change improves production efficiency. Technological progress is exogenous and modeled as a jump process with a drift. There is always a Markov perfect equilibrium in which the firm with more efficient technology never preempts its rival. Also, a class of equilibria may exist that lead to a smaller industry surplus. In these equilibria either of the firms may preempt its rival in a set of technology efficiency values. The first investment does not necessarily happen at the boundary of this set due to the discrete nature of the technology progress. The set shrinks and eventually disappears when the difference between firms’ efficiencies increases.his paper identifies the comparative advantage and the rank of the manufacturing industries of IRAN using traditional and environmental variables. To do so, in the first stage, manufacturing industries are ranked according to employment, value added and profitability and then air pollution indices are added into the analysis. The development levels of manufacturing industrie s are calculated using numerical taxonomy method at 2-digit industry levels. The results showed that the comparative advantage of Iranian manufacturing industries, regardless of the indices of sustainable development and when these indices are to be taken into account are distinct from each other. In the first stage, the manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products, manufacture of basic metals, manufacture of chemicals and chemical products and manufacture of food products and beverages are ranked highest in 2005 respectively. But when air pollution indices were added into the analysis, the manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products has lost its advantage. Thus, with regard to indices of sustainable development, the comparative advantage is not a sufficient indicator for ranking of industries in terms of their performance.
خلاصه ماشینی:
"In this study, because of the jumps, I find that in the preemptive investment the less efficient firm may invest prior to the time the preemption zone is reached in order to guarantee the adoption as a leader.
As I will later show, in both types of equilibrium that I introduce, at some values of the state variable the leader (firm ) adopts a new technology when it is optimal to do so without being preempted by its rival (firm ).
In the same type equilibrium that preemption happens, there may exist a new subset of the state space that the leader adopts a new technology without being preempted by its rival.
2-1- Payoff Functions If both firms adopt a new technology simultaneously, their payoff would be, where r is the discount rate and c is the value of the state variable when the adoption happens.
When the leader (firm ) adopts a new technology at , her value is (8) Firm i assumes that firm j would behave optimally as a follower according to what Lemma predicts.
At time Tj, when the value of the state variable falls in the stopping set , the follower will adopt a new technology.
The following proposition states that the preemption zone would not exist if the loss caused by adoption of a new technology by the rival is smaller than a certain level.
The function described in (44), is the solution to the following boundary value problem: (45) Lemma 5-2 Value of leader, firm , before reaching the adoption threshold (ie."