چکیده:
The normativity of mental content thesis appears to have been the most influential in contemporary philosophy of mind. Paul Boghossian (2003, 2005) has developed an argument for the normativity of mental content on the basis of two premises, i.e. firstly, the normativity of the notion of belief and secondly, the priority of the notion of belief to the notion of desire. In his recent article Alexander Miller (2008) has criticised Boghossian’s argument for the normativity of mental content. To make the objection against the normativity of content, Miller has argued that the second premise of Boghossian’s argument is since belief and desire are conceptually interdependent. My purpose in this paper is to show that content normativity thesis prevails Miller's attack. In order to establish the claim I will argue that content is normative even if belief and desire are conceptually interdependent.
خلاصه ماشینی:
Dose the Conceptual Interdependency of Belief and Desire Undermine the Normativity of Content?* Seyed Ali Kalantari** Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Isfahan, Iran Abstract The normativity of mental content thesis appears to have been influential in contemporary philosophy of mind.
To make the objection against the normativity of content, Miller has argued that the second premise of Boghossian’s argument is mistaken since belief and desire are conceptually interdependent.
The normativity of content Boghossian's normativity of content thesis can be clarified via the following four steps: In the first step, Boghossian claims that belief attributions are constitutively normative since, “it is a condition on understanding them that one understand that one ought to believe that P only if P” (Boghossian 2005: 212).
This is called the normativity of belief thesis in the literature and is endorsed by many key philosophers (see Engel 2001; Gibbard 2003, 2005; Shah 2003; Shah and Velleman 2005; Wedgwood 2002).
Miller on the conceptual interdependency of belief and desire and the normativity of content In his recent article, Alexander Miller (2008) argues that premise (6) of Boghossian’s argument is implausible.
In order to establish the claim I will argue that Boghossian could endorse Miller’s reflection that belief and desire are conceptually interdependent, whilst manoeuvring to preserve his argument for the normativity of content.
My alternative argument on behalf of Boghossian for the normativity of content has the following three premises: The concept of belief is independently normative.