چکیده:
THe regressive nature of consumption taxes poses a challenge to
partisan theory. Using data for up to 20 OECD countries in the
period 1970-2003 this article aims to explore the question of whether the idea that social democratic governments typically have to compromise on policy goals and core constituency interests to make themselves more appealing to the median voter necessitates the use of regressive consumption tax policies. The results suggest that the position of the median voter determines the actions of social democratic governments regarding regressive consumption taxes when globalization is pronounced
خلاصه ماشینی:
"Using data for up to 20 OECD countries in theperiod 1970-2003 this article aims to explore the question of whether the idea that social democratic governments typically have to compromise on policy goals and core constituency interests to make themselves more appealing to the median voter necessitates the use ofregressive consumption tax policies.
This article explores the question of whether domestic and global political-economic constraints prevent social democratic governments from reducing regressive consumption tax rates as part of their redistributive efforts on the revenue side.
We argue that, ceteris paribus, social democratic governments have an incentive to reduce consumption tax rates, but the pressures of globalization combined with the position of the median voter exert a significant impact on their consumption tax policy making.
While economic globalization plays a crucial role in mobilising voters, it generates the constraints that force social democratic governments to finance high public expenditure through tax policies that may not reflect the preferences of the median voter and/or their core constituencies.
The countries included in the sample are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
The negative coefficient is consistent with Ward et al’s (2011) ideological explanation; they argue that social democratic governments will not be constrained by economic globalization if the expected position of the median voter is far enough to the right."