چکیده:
The objective of this article is to show that it is justified to assert that the existence of God is plausible, considering the fact that thinking itself is an immediate outcome (effect) of a thinker (cause). This idea may seem evident, but it is in fact challenged by certain claims of cognitive philosophers who aver that our knowledge of necessity and causation is, in the final analysis, bounded by our naturalness. That is to say, what we understand of necessity and causation is originally based on root-experiences we have had from the early moments of our birth onward or even before our birth.
This article tries to display that giving a model for a kind of necessity which is not essentially built upon the naturalness of human experiences can negate the universality of believing in the naturalness of human understanding. With this, one can prove the probability of the existence of a Necessary Being, whose necessity is different from the so-called embodied necessity. However, the Necessary Being is not equal to all conceptions of God, but it is equal to some of them. The article concludes that the probability of the existence of God (of a particular kind) is an inevitable outcome, even with the presupposition of cognitive philosophers.
خلاصه ماشینی:
According to this explanation, what we understand of necessity and causation is originally based on bodily experiences we have had from an early moment when our perception was activated.
Embodied structures are universal in the sense that they are shared by humans (Johnson 1987) Johnson describes image schemas as "concepts" (1987); however, to me, this nomination does not mean that image schemas are totally abstract.
Image schemas are rudimentary concepts that derive from embodied experiences of the world, which are pre-conceptual.
Analysis of Force-Schemata Since image schemas are products of our direct experience of the world that surrounds us, they are common and familiar to us.
For example, it is quite common to understand the meanings and instances of schemas such as motion along a path, bounded interior, containment, symmetry, and force-dynamic (Johnson 1987; Turner 1996).
An interesting example is a logical argument, in which the conclusions derive necessarily from the premises, not by themselves but by a kind of necessity that comes from our image-schematic experiences of force (Johnson 1987).
Even after the acquisition of an image schema (regarded as a concrete entity), our epistemic system begins to understand abstract concepts based on concrete entities via a process called metaphor, as it is learned from the Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff and Johnson 2003).
Unembodied necessity lacks the seven most common force structures necessary for understanding the meaning of embodied necessity, so to speak.