چکیده:
Climate virtue ethics points to the subjective/personal dimensions of climate ethics, which have been largely neglected by previous research. There is a lot of research from diverse fields that pertains to the cultural and the individual dimensions that come along with climate virtue ethics, but, as of yet, these dimensions have hardly been examined together. Future research on climate virtue ethics should draw from religions, as religious traditions contain “thick” ideas that may inspire our thinking about how we can envision a life of personal moral integrity and what sustainable life styles may look like in the future. In order to unearth the potentials (Habermas) of these “thick” ideas that are contained in religions, we need to perform close readings of our traditions and ask those traditions which visions of human life they may offer in light of current moral challenges. Future climate virtue ethics is an endeavour that asks for the cooperation of theological ethics, comparative theology, moral psychology/behavioural business ethics, environmental psychology, social theory, and so forth.
خلاصه ماشینی:
For climate virtue ethics, all these questions are interesting only to a very limited extent—only in so far as discussing them is needed for working on the following questions: (a) How can the perspective of virtue help us understand why people are not doing what many of them would concede they are clearly obligated to do: to try to prevent climate change and the many ills that will come with it?
Previous work on business virtue ethics is only of limited use for climate virtue ethics, as most authors in the field of business virtue ethics consider market incentives, on the one hand, and virtues, on the other hand, to be either (a) allies or (b) enemies (Brunim und Sugden 2013; Sandel 2013; MacIntyre 1984, 187ff.
It is worthwhile to strive for such an ideal world by changing market incentives, but it is naïve to expect these changes to solve all our problems and it would be premature to fully leave aside virtue in the sense of moral strength and intrinsic motivation (Kant).
In order to unearth the potentials (Habermas) of these “thick” ideas that are contained in religions, we need to perform close readings of our traditions and ask those traditions which visions of human life they may offer in light of current moral challenges (Habermas 2001; Schmidt 2017).
Religious imagination is the capacity to draw productive moral motivation from the vision of a personal “religious” life (Cuneo 2015).
“Do Markets Corrupt?” In Economics and the Virtues: Building a New Moral Foundation, edited by Jennifer A.