خلاصة:
this paper evaluates attitudes of Iranians toward crossing red traffic lights and their sensitivity to fines. Economic theory of crime under expected utility predicts that because of the possibility of severe punishments, risk adverse individuals would not cross red lights. This is implied by the Becker proposition. However, among 262 individuals surveyed, more than half of the sample has previous records of conviction with respect to traffic laws. The result indicates that the effect of introducing a new fine on pedestrians is about twice the effect of increasing the existing fine on drivers by 150%. The elasticity of crossing red lights with respect to fine hike is -0.25. Regression analysis shows that previous record of breaking traffic laws, being single and crossing red lights by cars are significant explanatory variables for decision to do jaywalking.
ملخص الجهاز:
Economic theory of crime underexpected utility predicts that because of the possibility of severe punishments, risk adverse individuals would not cross red lights.
Regression analysis shows that previous record of breaking traffic laws, being single and crossing red lights by cars are significant explanatory variables for decision to do jaywalking.
If the Becker proposition holds, given the severe self-inflicted punishments of running red lights, there should be no change in behavior when one varies the external factors like the monetary punishments or probability of an accident.
People’s attitude towards jaywalking is best explained by their previous record of breaking traffic laws and if they would cross red lights by cars.
Data Collection Procedure and Its Description</H4> Participants were asked whether they would cross red lights while driving in a rush, and if yes, what if the fine increases up to 150%.
As compared to others, singles declared to cross fewer red lights by cars and have less previous records with respect to traffic laws.
Interestingly, the result after the fine hike shows the exact opposite; as compared to other people, single subjects declared to cross more red lights as drivers but less so as pedestrians.
Only 16% of this group would cross red lights while driving, and the elasticity of violation with respect to the fine hike is -0.
Individuals with previous records of breaking traffic laws would cross more red lights as pedestrians, while their sensitivity to a new fine is approximately similar to those without such records.