چکیده:
Central banks should act independently in regulating monetary, currency, credit policies, and not be subject to political and governmental influence, but must at the same time be accountable for their performance. Given that central banks are not part of the three branches of government, their accountability is challenging. Therefore, in the present paper, the concept of accountability of central bank is considered as one of the means of controlling and evaluating its performance. In this way, the concept and characteristics of accountability of central banks as well as mechanisms of accountability to executive, legislative and judicial branches of government are expressed and transparency of central bank is analyzed in response to accountability. Finally, a comparative review of accountability in Iran and the United States is being considered, and it is concluded that in the legal system of Iran, there is no mechanism for accountability of central bank and it lacks transparency.
خلاصه ماشینی:
Central Bank Accountability; A Comparative Study of the Legal Systems of the United States and Iran Maryam Kord1, Mahmoud Bagheri 2*, Abbas Ghasemi Hamed3, Mohsen Mohbi 4 Abstract Central banks must operate independently in setting monetary, exchange rate, and credit policies and not be subject to political or governmental influence; at the same time, they must be accountable for their performance.
They see accountability as a combination of concepts and responsibilities that are implemented in line with achieving economic performance goals and under the monetary policies of the central bank, and it is expected that under it, economic performance will be close to or consistent with standards or goals (4: 1998, Eijffinger &De haan, Amtenbrink).
3. Ultimate Responsibility for Monetary Policy Regarding the ultimate responsibility for monetary policy, four issues are important: accountability to parliament, accountability to the government, the existence of a specific type of decision reversal mechanism, and the process of dismissal and removal of the central bank governor, which are examined here (13: 1998, Eijffinger &Amtenbrink, De haan).
In this case, Parliament acts as a posterior accountability mechanism; in fact, the mere threat of changing the law causes even independent central banks (such as the Bundesbank of Germany) to adopt monetary policy in accordance with the wishes of elected politicians (, Wller &De haan, Eijffinger 110: 2005).
The annulment mechanism can create a bridge between the central bank and democratically elected institutions, namely Parliament and the executive branch, and also act as a tool to preserve the continuous accountability of the central bank while providing the possibility of government intervention.
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