The relationship between cognitive behaviorism and the denial of epistemic pluralism in Davidson's view مقاله

خلاصه ماشینی:

Like critics of the traditional concept of truth as correspondence, including Rorty, Davidson believes that “there are no interesting and accessible identities, identities that, because they are somehow related to sentences, can explain why some sentences are true and the rest are not” (66: Ibid). According to the theory of correspondence, there is a unique way to describe objects through which access to the intrinsic nature of objects can be gained, but from Davidson's point of view, such a unique description does not exist, not even in one or more of our admired languages, but in no possible language. But from Davidson's point of view, not only the traditional definition of truth as a theory of correspondence with reality, but also other definitions of truth that appear in the form of pragmatic, coherence, warranted assertibility, deflationism, and quotationism theories, cannot provide a complete explanation of the concept of truth, because the concept of truth is indefinable. He considers the truth predicate to be a sentence and expresses the condition of material adequacy in the form of T: For example, according to him, “snow is white” is true if and ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 5. (Ibid) The relationship between meaning and truth in the process of language learning From Davidson's point of view, the concept of truth is not definable but is very important, and its importance is due to its connection with meaning. Therefore, contrary to Rorty's view, Davidson believes that the concept of truth or objective truth is important for understanding sentences.