چکیده:
This book examines how beliefs shape leaders'' perceptions of reality and lead to cognitive and motivated biases that distort، block، and recast incoming information from the environment. Using content analysis and formal modeling methods associated with quantitative operational code analysis، contributors analyze how beliefs affect policies related to international security and international political economy. This book examines how beliefs shape leaders'' perceptions of reality and lead to cognitive and motivated biases that distort، block، and recast incoming information from the environment. Using content analysis and formal modeling methods associated with quantitative operational code analysis، contributors analyze how beliefs affect policies related to international security and international political economy.
خلاصه ماشینی:
The prominent feature of the book is its methodological approach; where the method of operational code analysis and game theory are used to explain the belief systems of different politicians and how their interactions are viewed from a power perspective.
” The authors in this book focus on the question of 'how politicians and policymakers make their decisions in foreign policy, which includes 4 levels of priority, strategy, tactics, and action?' They seek to explain how beliefs operate as causal mechanisms and, while guiding decisions, shape the perceptions of political leaders from reality and lead to cognitive orientations in them.
Methodology of the Book The full title of the book, namely “Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics; Methods and Applications of Operational Code Analysis,” shows that the authors place particular emphasis on the method they use and its richness and high potential as a psychological approach to studying political phenomena at both the individual and systemic levels.
Stephen Walker and Mark Schafer, in the first section of the first chapter of the book, while presenting theoretical discussions about the emergence of operational code analysis and its developments, examine the mental games of Isaac Rabin and Shimon Peres in the 1970s and 1990s and show that the two do not have the same operational code regarding the peace process, and therefore adopt different strategies.
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