چکیده:
This article examines the conditions of justification in empirical beliefs using an analytical method. In this article, we demonstrate that the theories of coherentism and foundationalism in the justification of these beliefs are incomplete. After examining these perspectives, we will present a new theory for the justification of these beliefs. In this theory, we have attempted to address the shortcomings of various theories in justifying these beliefs. Although this theory is constructed based on the introversionist assumptions of these theories regarding justification, we will see that this theory can be defended even by accepting extroversionism in justification.
خلاصه ماشینی:
Thus, if the knower actually does not have the ability to distinguish a myriagon shape, but based on the experience of a myriagon shape, believes that a myriagon shape exists before them, their belief is justified at first glance (in the sense that if no defeater belief contrary to that empirical belief exists) and the moderate foundationalist has no problem with this assumption and will provide an answer to the objection.
Therefore, people like Pollock have stipulated that the knower must not have a defeater belief against the belief obtained from that experience, and moderate foundationalists have stipulated coherence negatively in their theory, stating that lack of coherence undermines the justification of these beliefs.
The author says that since we added the condition of coherence with the other beliefs of the knower in the justification of these beliefs, we respond to this objection in this way: that if, from the perspective of the knower, the belief resulting from a specific experience, along with his other beliefs, provided those beliefs exist, is in coherent, then that belief is justified.
If the objector, to confirm his statement, says: "Suppose the knower has no beliefs at all, and in that moment, based on an experience, he constructs a belief, and we intuitively consider this belief of his to be justified," in response to him, we say that this assumption falls within the first part of the justification of empirical beliefs that the author himself believes in.
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