چکیده:
The issue of 'noumenon and phenomenon', for which equivalents such as 'being and appearance', 'thing-in-itself and phenomenon', and 'rational essence and appearance' have been placed in Persian, is one of the most important issues that Immanuel Kant has raised in his philosophical system. The implications of this issue can make its importance even more apparent. Some of the most important implications of this issue include: 1) Its impact on taking a position regarding the principle of identification and knowledge of the external world; 2) Its impact on the discussion of the unprovability of God through common arguments in philosophy and also on Kant's conception of God; 3) Its impact on Kant's moral philosophy; 4) Its impact on distancing his philosophical system from the criticisms raised against Berkeley's idealism on one hand and Hegelian phenomenalism on the other. In the present article, we have examined some dimensions of this issue in four axes and, after explaining Kant's view in distinguishing the two realms of noumenon and phenomenon from each other, while mentioning two interpretations of this distinction, we have referred to the implications of this theory and finally to some of the criticisms leveled against it.
خلاصه ماشینی:
Kant himself responds in this regard: "Although we cannot know these very objects and even the things-in-themselves, it is enough that we can think of them; because otherwise we would have to submit to the meaningless conclusion that a phenomenon is something that is not a phenomenon!"53 In fact, from a philosophical point of view, this statement—that only phenomena are identifiable to us from the world and therefore our knowledge is restricted and limited to the forms of sensory antecedents, namely time, space, and the twelve categories of understanding—will inevitably lead to the conclusion that in opposition to these phenomena (appearances), we must posit an unknowable essence and the thing-in-itself.
Scrutton believes that Kant, in his correspondence with 'Beck' and in many passages of the Critique of Pure Reason, as well as in a letter to one of the main defenders of this view, confirms this second opinion; for example, he writes: 'All objects that can be presented to us can be conceptualized in two ways: on one hand, as appearances; and on the other hand, as things-in-themselves';84 On the other hand, the fact that Kant rejects the division of objects into phenomena and noumena in a positive sense is a confirmation of the second interpretation: 'The division of objects into phenomena and intelligible essences and the division of the world into the sensible world and the world of understanding...
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