چکیده:
Based on the normativity of belief thesis, there is a normative relationship between a belief and its content. This aforementioned normative relationship is usually formulated by a norm that in philosophical literature is called the 'norm of belief'; in this way, 'a person ought to believe p if and only if p is true' (Shah, 2003, 2009). Our focus in this article is directed toward a specific topic regarding the normativity of belief thesis called the 'non-guidance norm argument', which was formulated by Glauert and Wikfors (2009, 2010, 2013, 2015). Glauert and Wikfors, by presenting this argument, have claimed that the norm of belief lacks a guiding role for the act of producing belief; based on this, they have concluded the falsity of the normativity of belief thesis. Our key goal in the present article is to critique their claim. To this end, after providing an account of the normativity of belief thesis, we specify the scope of actions that are constrained by the norm of belief according to this thesis. After critiquing the claim of Glauert and Wikfors, we will conclude the article by providing an analytical explanation regarding how to follow the norm of belief based on the normativity of belief thesis.
خلاصه ماشینی:
Glauert and Wykforce in their "non-guidance norm argument" state that if defenders of the normativity thesis of belief say that the mental act constrains believing, then this norm must play a guiding role 16 for a person who has accepted it for the production of belief, meaning that by accepting this norm, a person must discern under what conditions they should undertake a belief and under what conditions they must abandon a belief.
Apart from the above criticism, Gluer and Wikforss have also directed the "non-guidance argument" criticism toward the thesis of the normativity of belief, although the main goal of the following article is not to examine this criticism.
" Philosophers usually state that (R) controls and guides the action X for a person who has accepted this norm, in such a way that the fulfillment of the antecedent conditions will be a reason 26 or a motive 27 for the relevant person to perform action X, or in other words, when the antecedent conditions are met, (R) commands the relevant person to perform action X (in this regard, see Boghossian, 2003:39; Gluer and Wikforss, 2010:758).
In this case, based on this objection, the conclusion of the "non-guidance argument" that does not itself possess a guiding role will not be considered a problem for the belief normativity thesis.
Analysis and Conclusion Based on the explanations provided, the main point of this article in criticizing the "non-guiding norm argument" of Gluer and Wikforss is as follows: From a first-person perspective, the precondition for following the norm is that the relevant person determines whether p is true.
(
, 
, 
)
