چکیده:
In the present article, the ontological argument and the argument of the Sadiqin are subject to a comparative study because each represents a specific metaphysical view (the primacy of idea and the primacy of existence). It is assumed that by taking this representation into account, a more correct conception of the relationship between these two arguments can be obtained. Given that the ontological argument is based on the primacy of the idea, and considering the fundamental transformation of the primacy of the idea in the modern era compared to previous periods, the formulation presented for this argument in the two aforementioned periods will be different; accordingly, one cannot attribute a single purpose to both formulations of the ontological argument. Therefore, it is essential to consider this point in a comparative study between the argument of the Sadiqin and the ontological argument. Presenting two different formulations of the ontological argument helps us better understand the correspondence and divergence between these two arguments, as well as gain a better understanding of the metaphysical foundations of the ontological argument. On this basis, the divergence between the ontological argument with the Anselmian formulation and the Hegelian formulation will become clear, and we will also trace the correspondence of the argument of the Sadiqin with the Anselmian ontological argument and its divergence from the Hegelian ontological argument.
خلاصه ماشینی:
(515 :1368 In this way, the Anselmian formulation of the ontological argument is considered consistent with metaphysical requirements, because it involves explaining the dependence of the human mind on the absolute, considers the mind's attainment of truth as the result of the illumination of the divine intellect and the supreme good, explains the journey along this path through the qualitative change of the levels of wisdom and the realization of good, and is oriented toward the absolute good.
In explaining the relationship between absolute thought and the concepts of the human mind, it can be said that the idea of God is the self-inspiring thought to which our thought responds, and of course, these responses have various forms due to the finitude of our mind, the various manifestations of which are the finite concept, and for this reason "in the philosophy of religion, the absolute is placed as an object of cognition, not merely in the form of thought, but also in the form of its manifestation (Hegel, 1895, 34), and these various manifestations are what shape the different forms of revelation and the different forms of religious thought; essentially, revelation consists of any conception we can have of God, because "every universal idea we have in mind is a purely predicative meaning of the necessary being in itself, which is active in its own unfolding and makes itself manifest, apparent, and revealed" (ibid).