چکیده:
Conceptual relativism is a form of relativism that emphasizes the necessity of the mediation of conceptual frameworks, language, paradigms, or other mental and human-made apparatuses in the process of understanding reality and interpreting and reading the world. From the perspective of conceptual relativists, since the apparatuses and conceptual frameworks that hold this mediating role are numerous, diverse, and incommensurable, and since one cannot judge their correctness or incorrectness, different readings of the world and theories presented in various fields within different conceptual schemes, paradigms, and linguistic frameworks enjoy equal truth, veracity, and legitimacy. This article attempts, while providing an accurate introduction to conceptual relativism and referring to several important formulations of it, to show that bridging from conceptual relativism to epistemological relativism and the relativity of truth and veracity faces clear logical flaws. And conceptual relativism, assuming its correctness and validity, never necessitates relativism in truth and veracity.
خلاصه ماشینی:
From Conceptual Relativism to the Relativity of Truth and Veracity Date of Receipt: 2013/04/14 Date of Approval: 2013/05/07 Ahmad Vaezie * Conceptual relativism is a type of relativism that emphasizes the necessity of the mediation of conceptual frameworks, language, paradigms, or other mental and human-making apparatuses in the process of understanding reality and interpreting and reading the world.
From the perspective of conceptual relativists, given that the mechanisms and conceptual frameworks that fulfill this mediating role are numerous, diverse, and immeasurable, and that one cannot judge or adjudicate their correctness or incorrectness, different readings of the world and theories presented in various fields within the framework of different conceptual schemes, paradigms, and linguistic frameworks enjoy equal validity, truth, and justification.
It is true that the essence of conceptual relativism depends on two things: first, that the conceptual apparatus and scheme serve as a mediator between us and the external world and the object of cognition, meaning that the conceptual scheme and the mediator between the subject of consciousness and the external world should not be a single and fixed matter, and that different and multiple conceptual schemes and apparatuses can provide this mediating role for our access to reality; and second, that these conceptual schemes be "incommensurable" (Incommensurable), in the sense that one cannot judge among these multiple conceptual schemes that organize and structure our consciousness regarding the external world, deeming some invalid or incorrect and others true, or preferring one over others, but rather all of them, in the function they are equally good and acceptable.
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