چکیده:
The aim of this article is to examine the explanatory power of representationalism in the context of hallucination. Hallucination can be challenging in terms of posing the problem of non-existent entities. Therefore, the problem of the present article is the challenge arising from hallucination. The research method of the article is the logical analysis of concepts and, as far as possible, the mention of empirical evidence. In this regard, an attempt is made to show that memory may have a significant correlation with hallucination. This is done by resorting to tracking representationalism and providing several empirical examples that may support the representational role of memory in hallucination. A counterexample is presented in the article, and its design and ability to respond or not to it are examined. The result of the article is that representationalism can probably explain the problem of hallucination. Suggestions for further research are also provided.
خلاصه ماشینی:
Keywords: Illusion, phenomenal character, reductive representationalism, memory, function * Assistant Professor at the Institute for Research in Philosophy and Wisdom of Iran; Email Shapour.
When Mary hallucinates the color red [sees it under illusion], the phenomenal property of redness that she experiences truly exists and is instantiated 4; 2.
Therefore, although there is no external referent for the object (:flower) and the property (:yellowness) being hallucinated during the illusion, the phenomenal character of the illusion truly exists in an actual manner, possesses causal power, and is felt like a veridical perception.
To advance the discussion and confront the challenge of illusion, it is necessary first to provide a report on tracking representationalism and then to address the representational nature and extensiveness of memory.
The objection based on the idea that Mary hallucinates the color red even when all red colors have been removed from the world, is a confirmation of the point mentioned by the author: Mary was at one time in causal contact with the environmental red color or colors from which red can be derived, and now she represents it through her memory.
Along with emphasizing this decisive point that according to strong representationalism 1, the representation of a veridical perception is defined as a function through a functional component, and consequently, hallucination is defined and explained under the title of a "malfunction" 2 .
An attempt is made to strengthen the possibility that the challenge of hallucination can be answered through a causal report of representationalism, by resorting to the role of memory and listing some empirical evidence that may support the author's view.
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