چکیده:
Practical rules, in most propositions, are associated with musts and mustn'ts (and are related to what should and should not be). Also, concepts denoting human voluntary actions do not indicate the existence of their external instances. Therefore, the judgments of human volitional actions are considered be hypothetical and Unreal. Accordingly, it seems that these rulings follow the desires and wishes of humans and are devoid of truth and reality. According to Ayatollah Javadi Amoli, these characteristics only apply to practical rulings issued by ordinary people. While practical rulings can have reality and support with real and can have real effects. Then the method of proof and truth-seeking reason and rational demonstrative can be used to understand these actions. In this case, the existence of unreal and hypothetical concepts or unreal and hypothetical instances in these rulings does not prevent their discovery by demonstrative reason and demonstrative mind. On the other hand, the practical rulings of religion are issued based on the trute and reality of human existence and lead to human development and true happiness. Therefore, with the method of demonstrative reason, one can arrive at the same propositions and can reach the same issues that are expressed in religion, and there is correspondence and harmony between the rules of religion and the rules of demonstrative reason in the field of voluntary actions.
خلاصه ماشینی:
The Relationship between Reason and Revelation in the Practical Rulings of Religion from the Perspective of Ayatollah Javadi Amoli Hossam al-Din Sharifi * | Hadi Yasaghi ** Abstract Practical rulings, in most propositions, are correlated with oughts and ought-nots.
In this writing, by referring to the views of Ayatollah Javadi Amoli, the relationship between the practical rulings of revealed religion and reason is examined and explained, showing that human actions, as one of the truths, are objectively recognizable, and the rulings that denote the manner of actions performed by humans are, in a sense, indicative of reality.
Therefore, although the practical rulings of religion and reason may be perceived as conventional, this conventionality in concepts and prescriptive propositions derived from them is connected to the truth and the real purpose of human beings.
Oughts and ought-nots are the necessary implications of the theoretical reason's realistic recognitions of human actions, which constitute true knowledge and practical wisdom.
However, if practical rulings are not formed from theoretical reason and based on ontological realities, they are pure conventions and derive from human desires and inclinations rather than human reality and his true needs, and they have no external instances.
621) Therefore, the practical rulings and laws of religion also possess originality and reality; they are not merely products of abstraction and convention, and everything that is itself ontological or has roots in creation and the real world is subject to intellectual recognition and the establishment of proof.
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