چکیده:
Argument through appearance and argument through representational properties that exist in phenomenological features (such as the conditions of truth and accuracy of experience and its conceptual context) are among the arguments raised in favor of representationalism. Representationalism regarding the phenomenological characteristic of the conscious experience of experience consists of two claims; one is that no phenomenological change is possible without a change in representational content, and the second is that no change in representational content is possible without a phenomenological change. Counterexamples have been raised for each of the two claims of representationalism; some of them refer to cases in which a phenomenological change occurs, although there is no change in representational content, and the second group refers to cases in which the representational content changes without the phenomenological features changing. In this article, the above arguments and their counterexamples will be examined.
خلاصه ماشینی:
Arguments For and Against Representationalism Sayer Pour Esmaeil* Abstract: Arguments through appearance and arguments through representational properties that exist in phenomenological features (such as the truth conditions and accuracy of experience and its conceptual context) are among the arguments put forward in favor of representationalism.
Representationalism equates the phenomenological character of redness with the quality of redness of the rose itself, whereas proponents of the qualia view consider phenomenological properties to be the qualities of the experience itself, not the quality of the external object being represented in the experience.
There are numerous arguments for the general idea of representationalism; for example, arguments through representational properties found in phenomenological features; such as arguments through the truth conditions and accuracy2 of experience, arguments through its conceptual context3, and arguments through appearance.
Proponents of representationalism consider the core idea of this view to be an intuitive one, meaning that the phenomenological character of an experience is identical to its representational content; because in our common and everyday understanding, we realize that pain—for example—is not just the quality of our internal experience, but indicates a state in one of our body parts.
In the following, the argument through appearance and the argument through the representational properties of phenomenological features (truth conditions and accuracy or the conceptual context of experience) will be presented.
In this way, we have a case of two different phenomenological properties with a single representational content, which is a counterexample to representationalism.
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