چکیده:
In this writing, the view of Mirza Mahdi Isfahani, as the founder of the School of Distinction (Maktab al-Tafkik), regarding the most important issues of epistemology such as the nature of cognition, types of cognition, truth, and the justification of knowledge is examined. Given that epistemology has not been considered an independent science in the Islamic world, but rather Muslim thinkers have presented it within the context of philosophical, theological, and logical discussions, in this article, a type of Mirza Mahdi's view has been reconstructed from among his theological opinions. One of Mirza Mahdi's characteristics is the expression of specific theories in opposition to common views regarding cognition. Therefore, his view in the field of epistemological discussions deserves serious analysis, critique, and review. To this end, his words regarding the nature of knowledge, types of knowledge, the meaning of truth, and the criterion of truthfulness have been collected and analyzed and critiqued based on the discussions presented in epistemology.
خلاصه ماشینی:
com Sadegh Amoli Larijani Seminary and University Lecturer Abstract {IBIn this writing, the view of Mirza Mahdi Isfahani, as the founder of the School of Separation (Maktab al-Tafkik), regarding the most important epistemological issues such as the nature of cognition, types of cognition, truth, and the justification of knowledge is examined.
Given that epistemology has not been considered an independent science in the Islamic world, but rather Muslim thinkers have presented it within philosophical, theological, and logical discussions, in this article, a type of Mirza Mahdi's view has been reconstructed from among his theological opinions.
o} Mirza Mahdi's views on the most important epistemological issues, such as the nature of cognition, types of cognition, truth, and the justification of knowledge, can be collected and examined.
For as was mentioned in the ontological discussion, the late Mirza considers science, alongside other luminous beings, to be self-subsisting realities outside of the human soul, and not as an accident or a state within the soul.
The late Mirza Mahdi, where he considers words to be indicative of external truths and not of meanings, actually validates the point that the sides of correspondence are one the word and the other is external reality, and the mental form is outside the scope of discussion.
Now, in light of these matters, it can be said: since the late Mirza Mahdi considers at least the innate, the mutawatir, and the sensory to be valid, he cannot deny that in human sciences too, certainty and conviction in accordance with reality are possible and attainable; because he has explicitly stated {o(1).
(
, 
, 
)
