Persian Summary of English Articles مقاله

چکیده:

For many religious people, the issue of doubt regarding their doctrinal and religious rulings and commands has always existed. Often these beliefs and convictions are considered 'propositional,' serving as a necessary, albeit insufficient, condition for salvation. This causes anxiety and concern for many doubters in these matters and raises a question based on what this very 'belief' is in religion and generally in life? This is a question that the philosophy of religion and Christian theology have neglected. In this article, I proceed to describe and explain the question of the importance of belief and conviction as a religious approach and suggest that there is at least another attitude and approach that may be sufficient and adequate for religious faith, even in the absence of [religious] belief, and that attitude is 'hope.' I expand a concept of faith as hope and as another aspect to this dominant conception that creates the propositional belief that 'God exists as a necessary condition for having faith,' as Plantinga points out. To simplify the discussion, I focus on the most important rule and proposition in Western religious creed and beliefs, which is the doctrine that 'God exists'—defined in a comprehensive and all-encompassing way as a benevolent being and a higher existence responsible for creating the world. Of course, this analysis can also be used to make necessary changes in many important religious propositions; for example, in reincarnation and the doctrine of the Trinity. I do not know correctly how these ideas can be adapted to Islamic thought, but I present this writing to stimulate and raise discussions between Christian philosophy and Islamic philosophy regarding the subject of 'faith and doubt.' The 'Logical Problem of Evil' is one type of the 'Problem of Evil.' The claim of the problem is that there is a logical inconsistency between the belief in the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God and the belief in the existence of evil. Alvin Plantinga, with his 'Free Will Defense,' has argued that they are logically compatible. This article first presents his argument. Then it raises three criticisms of it, which are based on compatibility, the omnipotence of God, and God's knowledge of contrary-to-fact conditions. Then Plantinga's responses are addressed, which are based on a counterexample, Leibniz's error, and universal fallibility. Almost everyone accepts that Plantinga's defense is successful. Now the issue is the 'Evidential Problem of Evil.' For this issue to be resolved, a theodicy is necessary. Plantinga proposes a theodicy, but he is not successful at all. Muslims must pay attention to this neglected issue.