چکیده:
"Aristotle's Interpretations of the Principle of Non-Contradiction" is the title of an article written by the authors in the Journal of Philosophical-Theological Research, issues 31 and 32, which is responsible for reviewing Aristotle's view on the principle of the impossibility of contradiction. Three basic conclusions are drawn in this article: 1) Aristotle does not have a single interpretation of this principle, 2) The inconsistency of some of Aristotle's views in this regard, 3) The propositional nature of this principle according to Aristotle's account. In this writing, an attempt is made to challenge the ideas presented in these topics from two perspectives and to show the insufficiency of the supporting reasons for those ideas; a) Showing the interpretations of Aristotle's fragments that play the role of premises in all the arguments of that article and b) Arguing against the core ideas presented in the article.1
خلاصه ماشینی:
The authors' argument that the meaning of "possible" in the quoted passage is not a specific possibility[012] is futile without the explanation mentioned above (considering the meaning of Impossible); however, the argument presented in that article is worthy of reflection, as follows: 1) If the intended meaning of possibility in the above phrase were a specific possibility, the phrase, given the negativity of possibility within it, would mean: It is not the case that the conjunction and non-conjunction of the being and non-being of an object in a single time are not necessary.
To clarify the meaning of opposition in the passage under discussion, the authors add: a) Exactly as many words with negative prefixes, there are types of privations (privation) (2201 b 23-53)91 (the translation provided in the article is distorted); b) Negation (of unity) is only its absence 02, and privation implies a fundamental nature upon which privation is attributed (4001 a 51-02); c) Someone who, in response to a question about whether something is white, says "no" (no), has not denied anything other than its being (being white - translator), and non-being is a negation (2101 a 51-02)12[412-312].
32 It is not at all clear how, in the article under consideration, after referring to the definitions of privation and negation (denial) and with regard to the second part of Aristotle's "Ba" passage, which is repeated in [412], this conclusion is presented that: In the above expression (the content of Aristotle's "Ba" passage), absolute opposition is not considered from the principle of contradiction, but only the opposition of contradiction or negation and affirmation (saying yes and saying no) is intended [412].
(
, 
, 
)
