چکیده:
Since the most important evidence to extract the rulings is rationalists' decisions، the nature of such decisions is required to be investigated and analyzed in the scope of the existing problems. Having studied the principles of Juridical-legal reasons for rationalists' decision، the author tried to prove the authentication and validity of the first basis where there is no need for rational decision to be authenticated by the lawgiver. The next step was to review the results of these principles in dealing with the existing problems. There was no need for the rational decision to be authenticated by the lawgiver with respect to the first basis which seems to be the only true basis regarding the rationalists' decisions. Then there was no need for the rational decision to be authenticated by the legislator too.
خلاصه ماشینی:
The second conditional sentence: that if the Infallible (as) were to prohibit the people from acting according to the intended rational consensus, the news of it would certainly have reached us; because the Lawgiver's prohibition of a rational method that is practiced by everyone is considered so important that it would undoubtedly have a wide reflection in today's society and would be narrated by various individuals, and since such a prohibition has not reached us, it can itself be a discovery that no prohibition has taken place (Na'ini, 1376, 3, 192; Musavi Khomeini, 1367, 2, 166).
The late Isfahani, while expressing explicit opposition to the famous view and declaring the sufficiency of "failure to establish prohibition," writes: "What is required for the authority of the method of rational agents is merely that prohibition and prevention by the Lawgiver is not proven for it, and it is no longer necessary to prove the absence of prohibition and establish its endorsement; otherwise, in case of ignorance of the absence of prohibition or lack of knowledge of the Lawgiver's endorsement, we would have to base the foundation on the non-authority of this consensus" (1374, 3, 12).
Consequently, in the affirmation and non-prohibition of a practice by the Lawgiver, it is not necessary for the subject to have existed during the time of the Lawgiver, and accordingly, in contemporary issues (mustahdathah), one can rely on the consensus of rational agents according to this basis.