چکیده:
This article first deals with the historical background of imagination and those who influenced Kant. Then، objectivity is explained and finally، the role of imagination in the Critique of Pure Reason is discussed. Imagination as a mental faculty has a unique place in Kant’s cognitive system. It plays a more active role in his system than it does in the philosophical systems before Kant. On the one hand، imagination is active in the sophisticated discussion of the transcendental deduction of the categories of understanding. On the other hand، it is active in schematism of the categories. Both of them are important in the objectivity of knowledge. The a priori forms of space and time are born of this faculty. All these are indicative of imagination’s prominent position in Kant’s epistemology; the issue that can be seen clearly in Kant's immediate successors. However، this prominence may be seen as a shortcoming in epistemology since it hinges objectivity on the subject.
خلاصه ماشینی:
This marks the beginning of the rise of imagination in Kantian epistemology, such that the transcendental synthesis of imagination is placed at the foundation of all our concepts of understanding (Kant, 2005: 258); and this power becomes the basis of all kinds of a priori cognition.
In any case, Kant, in the specific additions of the second edition, explicitly regards synthesis as the act of the understanding: "The synthesis of a multiplicity in general can never occur in us through the senses and therefore cannot have been previously contained in the pure form of sensory intuition.
Again, in the text that is common between the two editions, there is mention of the synthesis of the faculty of imagination: "The first thing that must be given to us a priori for the cognition of all objects is the multiplicities of pure intuition.
Therefore, 'the categories of understanding, without the assistance of imagination, are merely pure forms of thought which, if they are to have meaning and concept, must be connected to our sensibility through the figurative synthesis of imagination' (Fooladi, 1392: 36).
that the pure intuitions of space and time belong to the power of productive imagination (Kant, 2006: 60), but also says in the first Critique: "Only by means of this synthesis ["figurative synthesis"] (that is, in this process in which the understanding determines sensibility), space and time are given as intuitions" (B161n).
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