چکیده:
Motile agency is an expression that Ibn Sina employs after stripping causality of the meaning of granting existence from the status of agents present in the natural world, in order to justify their effects. However, a careful reflection on the meaning and mode of existence of motion indicates that in Ibn Sina's intellectual system, motion is among the contingent matters and is an accidental property; therefore, in its emergence, it requires an independent cause to create it. Consequently, the natural agent, which was initially assumed to be the provider of motion, is now presented with this explanation as the giver of existence. Based on this, questions arise: what is ultimately the role of the natural agent? And when it is said that the natural agent imparts motion, what does that mean? Is there a difference between creating motion and creating other beings that allows Ibn Sina to attribute causality in the sense of creating motion to the natural agent? In this article, after presenting and analyzing Ibn Sina's position in two parts—efficient cause and motile cause—while pointing to the apparent contradiction in Ibn Sina's words, an attempt is made to use his 'theory of inclination' as a way to resolve this contradiction.
خلاصه ماشینی:
He, who also pays attention to the influence of natural beings on one another, refers to them as the "mover" (fa'il al-haraka), but if we scrutinize the Sheikh's words in the discussion of motion, it becomes clear that the act of the motive cause is also of the type of creation.
Finally, by stating that the effects of bodies are contingent upon establishing a specific state between them and their effects, Avicenna, while denying the causality of one body in the creation of another, defines them merely as mediating causes that provide the ground for the emanation of all beings of the natural world, including substances and accidents, from the aspect of the Active Intellect (Tusi, 1375, p.
97) The analysis that Avicenna performed in this section clearly expresses the fact that, according to his belief, motion is considered among the accidents; likewise, the precision in his arguments in denying the motivating nature of pure nature, which we presented above, in addition to the division of motion into two types, natural and forced, all indicate that in this philosophical system, motion is of the type of separable accidents that are created through compositional making; therefore, in the Avicennian philosophical system, when it is said that bodies are the agents of motion, it means that although they are not capable of creating substantial forms and are considered numerical causes in relation to them; however, since in this philosophical system motion is an accident of the category of an yanfa'ila, it can be said that causality in the sense of creating an accident exists, and bodies are capable of creating accidental forms; and from here, one must seek the answer to this question: what is the difference between the creation of substance and the creation of an accident, which has caused Avicenna to deny one from the station of bodies and attribute the other to them?
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