چکیده:
Despite the fact that in classical Islamic philosophy, the discussion of the primacy and conventionality of existence and essence has been considered two separate and distant discussions from epistemology until now, this article attempts to emphasize the decisive role of the epistemological viewpoint in adopting either the perspective of the primacy of existence or essence by explaining the fundamental and close connection between these two fields. In the first part of the article, after revealing the correlation between the notion of the primacy of essence and the conventional perception of knowledge—namely, the belief in this essential identity—and expressing the incompatibility of the notion of the primacy of existence with such a perception and belief, and especially by explaining the futility of the solutions offered to resolve the doubts regarding mental existence, the necessity of adopting a new perception and a fresh pattern in knowledge is proven. Then, in the next section, through reflection on the meaning of essence and the essence of meaning, the dual-sided, relational, and manifest nature of knowledge is explained and rationally analyzed. Based on this new view of the truth of knowledge, referred to as the theory of the phenomenological primacy of meaning, the assumed distinction between the primacy of essence and the primacy of existence is denied, and the acceptance of the primacy of both is embraced. In the final part of the article, the ancient problem of unity and multiplicity is addressed, and based on the theory of the phenomenological primacy of meaning, an attempt is made to unravel the unsolved mystery of accidental multiplicity and semantic differences, and to provide a proper response to the problems of mental existence.
خلاصه ماشینی:
Conflict of the Gradational Approach with the Belief in Knowledge Reflection on this meaning clearly reveals that denying the distinction of the realities of things in any way — whether based on the gradational approach and attributing essential differences to the levels of existence, or based on the atomistic approach and attributing differences to the variation in the formation and ratios of fundamental particles — is inseparable from denying the identity between mental perceptions and external realities; because if these concepts are revealing of the external world and represent reality, then "the external" itself must be exactly what these concepts indicate; meaning, it must be diverse and multiple according to the multiplicity of meanings.
In addition to the fact that the theory of the mental form being a representation (tamathul), in terms of the belief in the acquisition of knowledge and the conviction in the identity of mental perceptions with the external, is subject to fundamental criticisms, another major problem is that essentially any kind of comparison between mind and reality, and any distinction made between the judgments and attributes of external beings and mental beings, is based on a perception from the external.
The importance of this explanation and perception lies in the fact that while it solves the problems of mental existence, the manner of the correspondence between the external reality (ayn) and the mind, the way accidental multiplicity arises, and the problematic dispute between the primacy of existence and the primacy of essence, þ at the same time, neither is the belief in this identity and knowledge undermined, nor is the thought of raw essential primacy—which considers the world to consist of truths with distinct essences—confirmed, nor is even the slightest deviation from the strong foundations and principles of Transcendent Wisdom (al-Hikmah al-Muta'aliyah) permitted.
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