چکیده:
Aristotelian logicians for the most part divide concepts into universal and particular and then discriminate and explain them. But some scholars like Ayat Allah Javadi Amoli believe that there is no particular concept and all concepts are universal. It seems that، for the destiny of this division being clear، it is necessary to explain plainly the distinction criterion for particular and universal concepts. When this criterion being clarified، the signification of these two kinds of concepts and the explanation of true and false propositions containing them will be clarified too. Logicians believe that particular concepts have no use in argumentative sciences، because they do not provide a persistent، certain science. However، sometimes some particular concepts have been used in argumentative sciences and there are scholars who believe that statements containing particular concepts could make persistent certainty for men. Their remarks may be justifiable in the light of earlier scholars’ sayings.
خلاصه ماشینی:
This qualifier causes the exclusion of those universal concepts which, due to a reason outside the essence of the concept, cannot be truthfully applied to many ِ individuals (Avicenna, 2004: 12; Qutb al-Din Razi, 2007: 126); for example, the concept of the Necessary Existent has only one instantiation, which does not cause this concept to be particular.
Denying the existence of real particular concepts is not consistent with the views of Ibn Sina, Mulla Sadra, and many sages; because humans intuitively realize that there are concepts that denote only one person and in no way can other individuals be imagined for them; for example, the representation resulting from "this human" denotes 016 a specific human in the external world and does not apply to any other instance (Ibn Sina, 1404: 196).
C. The use of personal propositions in demonstrative sciences can also be justified in this way: if individuals are understood through their causes, they provide universal and certain knowledge to humans (Aristotle, 1980: 2/ 418); thus, sometimes permanent and necessary certainty can be found in particular and sensory things, provided that we gain knowledge of them through their causes; for example, if we find knowledge of the occurrence of a lunar eclipse in a specific time and state based on its cause, it is certain knowledge (Avicenna, 1379: 22 and 145).
The instance of such a proposition is mental, not external; 2) knowledge of the particular concept is through its cause, in which case our knowledge of that particular is in the form of a universal restricted to an individual.
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