چکیده:
The long-standing and controversial issue of generalities is rooted in general and partial epistemology in logic. The issue of general and partial can be examined in three semantic, epistemological and ontological areas. Logic and philosophy can be used in the field of epistemology. Studying the conformity and correspondence of these two concepts with their examples belongs to the field of logic, and the origin and formation of these concepts in mind is a philosophical discussion. Since logic has always been considered as a prelude to the science of philosophy, this research is aimed at explaining general and partial knowledge in Ibn Sīnā’s logic. Ibn Sīnā’s logic is one of the most brilliant periods in the history of logic. The research findings include justifying the position of the discussion of the general and partial in single words, explaining the definition of partial and general, Ibn Sīnā’s strategy in coping with the forms of non-impossibility of supposition in understanding partial concept as well as real and additional general and partial.
خلاصه ماشینی:
The justification of the position of the discussion on the universal and the particular in the section of single words, the clarification of the definitions of particular and universal, Avicenna's solution for overcoming the problem of the non-impossibility of assumption in attaining the concept of the particular, and the comparison of relations between real and additional universals and particulars are among the achievements of this research.
For this reason, "a spherical shape surrounded by twenty triangular rules," although it is possible-to-exist, does not exist at all; likewise, the sun and the moon, which according to philosophers are no more than one in external reality and, according to them, it is impossible for them to be more than one, are considered instances of the definition of the universal; because the conception of each of these concepts in the mind does not prevent the sharing of multiplicity in it; meaning, each of these concepts is capable of being predicated of more than one (Ibn Sina, 1375, p.
3. A Discussion Regarding the Concept of the Particular Based on Avicenna's definition, the very conception of a particular meaning makes having multiple individuals impossible, but it seems that no concept possesses such a characteristic; because although a particular is realized in reality without multiple individuals, such a particular is a philosophical particular and not a logical particular.
Khwaja Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, in his commentary on Avicenna's words, says: The universal is divided into three types in terms of the existence of an individual or individuals in reality: impossible-to-exist, necessary-to-exist, and possible-to-exist.
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