چکیده:
Although in recent decades the positivist view regarding the analytic-synthetic distinction has faced serious criticisms, the main consequences of this distinction, such as the denial of realism in the realms of mathematics and logic and the separation of knowledge and values, still largely persist in contemporary philosophy of science. In this paper, while examining the numerous problems empiricists face in explaining the epistemological position of analysts, it will be argued that Quine's approach, although declaring the deadlock of the positivist view regarding analysts, not only does not separate itself from the positivist conventionalism—which is in conflict with any kind of scientific inquiry and dialogue—in mathematics and logic, but also extends this conventionalism to the realm of empirical sciences. A re-examination of realism in the two fields of mathematics and logic as a way to exit this deadlock is the final suggestion of this paper. In this suggestion, by referring to some of the capabilities of Aristotelian philosophy in solving the problem of analysts, it will be used to strengthen realism in these two fields.
خلاصه ماشینی:
Empiricism and the Challenge of Analyticity Reza Sadeghi Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Isfahan Abstract Although in recent decades the positivist view regarding the analytic-synthetic distinction has faced serious criticisms, the primary consequences of this distinction, such as the denial of realism in the realms of mathematics and logic and the separation of knowledge and value, still persist to a large extent in contemporary philosophy of science.
In this paper, while examining the numerous problems empiricists face in explaining the epistemological status of analytics, it will be argued that Quine's approach, although declaring the deadlock of the positivist view regarding analytics, does not only fail to depart from positivist conventionalism—which is in conflict with any kind of scientific inquiry and dialogue—in mathematics and logic, but also extends this conventionalism to the realm of empirical sciences.
In this case, it is an identity proposition that has no explicit application in everyday language or science, and its widespread use by empiricists is solely to convey the point that mathematical and logical analytics are all equally insignificant.
For example, one could say that murder means killing, which in this case would be an empirical sentence whose truth is contingent upon awareness of conventions, and from this perspective, it differs from logical and mathematical propositions.
Not to mention that the laws of ethics, from the perspective of many religions, are also conventions, not even belonging to God. Realism regarding Logic and Mathematics In summarizing what has passed, it can be said that in empirical philosophy, there is no clear criterion for defining analytics; existing definitions are, on one hand, incompatible with each other and, on the other hand, often require intellectual intuition.
(
, 
, 
)
