چکیده:
In the first Critique, Kant delineated the principles of metaphysics of nature and in the second Critique, those of metaphysics of morality. Since these two kinds of principles were essentially distinguished, there appeared an absolute gap between nature and morality, which Kant called abyss or gulf and emphasized that it is "incalculable". That is, if one considers only the first and the second Critique, one should accept the dualism in the essence of subject. Kant, however, takes over in the third Critique the task of investigating the possibility of transition between the two sections of the dualism. In this paper, we try first to clarify what it means that a transition occurs between nature and morality and then to show how it occurs. Before that, however, we should transform the metaphorical expression of "gulf" into a logical one in order to get the problem right. Once this is done, the meaning of transition becomes clear. In order to delineate how the transition is realized, we should appeal to concepts of the beautiful and the sublime. The transition in the sphere of the beautiful occurs in three instances: intellectual interest in beautiful, the genius, and being the symbol of morality. But in the sphere of the sublime which is "formless", one should go beyond the purposiveness of the form of nature. It will be clear that the sublime represents the possibility of transition in two respects: by introducing the idea of humanity and morality and by aesthetic representation of reason "as both theoretical and practical" which is nothing but unity of the first and the second part of Kantian philosophy.
خلاصه ماشینی:
Because these two types of principles were distinct, a rupture emerged between nature and morality, which Kant interpreted as a gulf or abyss, emphasizing that it is unnavigable; meaning, if we only consider the first and second Critiques, we must accept the dualism or absolute bifurcation of subjectivity.
e. , the supersensible, that no transition from the former to the latter (by means of the theoretical use of reason) is possible, as if these two domains were two different worlds where the former can have no influence or impact on the latter; yet the latter must in some way influence and impact the former, in such a way that the concept of freedom must bestow the end given by its own laws upon the sensible world of reality, and nature must consequently be able to be thought in such a way that the legality of its form is at least harmonious with the possibility of ends in nature, in accordance with the laws of freedom" (Kant, 1790: B xx).
Kant immediately points out the lack of objectivity of this interest for transcendental investigation and continues by saying that if we are to "discover an interest in the beautiful, taste discovers for our faculty of judgment the transition [passage] from sensory pleasure to moral feeling" (Kant, 1393: 41§) and thus "a mediating link in the chain of the aforementioned faculties will be revealed, upon which every legislation must depend" (ibid.
In this same paragraph, Kant explains two types of faculties of judgment and considers their kinship fundamental, which makes the transition from beautiful nature to the realm of morality possible.
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