چکیده:
Musharakah as one of the approved financing methods for economic activities by Islam and according to its jurisprudential basis is formed through the blending of partners’ fund. All partners have the right to contribute and monitor and manage the economic activity. One of the major concepts in Musharakah contract is profit-loss sharing (division of profit and loss) proportionately to every partner’s fund at the end of the contract or the economic activity. Major challenges which banks face in the appropriate performance of Musharakah contract are as follow: a) the necessity of supervision and auditing in economic activities، hence using some auditors which end with the increased costs. b) Asymmetric information and lack of confidence towards the income statement prepared by the applicant. c) Uncertainty about the economic activity results، hence market risk. Despite the afore- mentioned challenges، appropriate implementation of Musharakah contract will have desired economic consequences which cover the costs related to these challenges. Some of the desired economic results are: equitable income distribution، decreasing inflationary pressures and decreasing production cost، increasing productivity investment and employment، not needing mortgage، risk diversification. Proper implementation of Musharakah contract and releasing from afore-mentioned challenges require some solutions such as: Diminishing Musharakah (gradual transferring of bank’s share to the applicant)، insurance contracts، considering some special accounts for probable losses، risk diversification of the bank (in order to encounter economic shocks and recession period)
خلاصه ماشینی:
To correctly implement the partnership contract and also to overcome the aforementioned challenges, several solutions have been proposed, including: diminishing partnership (gradual sale of the bank's share to the applicant); incentive contracts (motivating the applicant to exert more effort and provide accurate profit and loss reports); insurance of contracts; considering a special account for potential losses; distribution of the risk of paid facilities and reducing the bank's profit share (to cope with economic shocks and recession periods).
When the bank responds to the applicant's request for partnership facilities and provides the necessary capital, and without sufficient presence and supervision, requests a profit and loss report from the applicant at the end of the company's activity, at this point, the possibility of the "moral hazard" problem arises; that is, when the applicant completes the economic activity without the supervision of the bank (as the other partner) and each of the partners is obliged to provide a report of their activities at the end for settlement and distribution of shares, at this time, there is the possibility of two deviations: first, in presenting the profit and loss report, they show the project costs more than the actual amount, and second, they report the profit obtained from the activity less than the actual amount.
As mentioned, in the Law of Interest-Free Banking Operations, the bank, as the agent of the depositors, is obliged to pay their funds to applicants in accordance with various Islamic contracts and to receive the profit obtained from these facilities not based on contracts but in proportion to different economic sectors.
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