چکیده:
The notion of naturalism's self-defeat has a long historical lineage. In more recent times, two prominent formulations of the self-defeat objection against naturalism have emerged: the argument from reason and the evolutionary argument. These arguments aim to address two fundamental tenets of naturalism. The argument from reason challenges the idea that mental states are solely causally related, while the evolutionary argument questions the inherent reliability and trustworthiness of cognitive faculties. Both the evolutionary argument and the argument from reason account for the self-defeating aspects of naturalism, accurately pinpointing its inherent flaws: (1) A simplistic justification of mental phenomena within a materialistic context is not the most comprehensive or exclusive rational justification available; (2) according to the theory of natural selection, naturalism prioritizes survival and reproduction over the pursuit of true beliefs; (3) the assertion that cognitive faculties are products of chance undermines the reliability and trustworthiness of these faculties; (4) rather than pursuing epistemic persuasion through its explanatory power, methodological naturalism has transformed into an epistemic presupposition. While these arguments possess strengths in challenging naturalism, it is important to acknowledge their inherent limitations as well. We argue that these flaws are specific to the argument from reason and the evolutionary argument, and therefore, they do not absolve naturalism from other self-defeating objections. Utilizing the analytical-critical methodology, this article aims to accomplish two objectives: firstly, to conduct a comparative study of the argument from reason and the evolutionary argument in elucidating the self-defeating nature of naturalism, and secondly, to articulate the strengths and weaknesses of these two arguments through supplementation and criticism.
خلاصه ماشینی:
In this writing, first, a background of the notion of the self-refuting nature of naturalism is mentioned; second, the two arguments presented by Lewis and Plantinga toward proving the self-refutation of atheistic naturalist views are discussed; then, in a comparative study, the points of agreement and disagreement between these two arguments will be stated, and finally, with a complementary and critical look, the strengths and weaknesses of the rational argument and the evolutionary argument will be addressed.
Plantinga states in Premise 1 that by combining naturalism and evolution, the probability that our cognitive faculties produce reliably correct beliefs becomes very low.
Rejection of Metaphysical Naturalism In examining the rational and evolutionary arguments, an image of naturalism constantly comes to mind that shows it as a metaphysical rather than a methodological position; meaning that naturalism always considers its view an inseparable part of the scientific worldview regarding the entities existing in the world and states that modern knowledge pays no attention to God, other supernatural beings, and generally the supernatural, or in other words, has set them aside.
This argument does not condemn naturalism on the grounds that rationality possesses another type of connection, a connection that cannot be composed of irrational cause-and-effect relationships; rather, the point of the evolutionary argument is that the combination of naturalism and evolution most likely cannot provide a system of causes and effects that would result in individuals' cognitive faculties enabling us to have true beliefs in a reliable manner.
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