چکیده:
Economic theories consider asymmetric information as a major factor of market failure. Usually the producer has more information about the production quality than the consumer، very much like laborers’ more information in regard to their skill and efficiency as compared to their employers. Thus، in the conventional economic literature especially in neoclassical economic thought، measures have been taken to prevent market failure. This is discussed in the fields of «Economics of Information» and «Contract Theory». In the Islamic School of Economics، therefore، various jurisprudential issues related to contracts are included، which prove the important role of the principle of symmetric information in that area، with its pertinent strategies formulated to provide accurate information for the market. Consequently، the contractors should be in touch with the necessary amount of information about the transaction to guarantee a sound and safe one. One of the main components of information is «time». This paper shows the pivotal status of time that can result in Muslims’ market efficiency so much so that its absence can cause the cancelation of the contract and market failure. In fact one could assert that «time» as an effective factor in symmetric information، indicates the high status of Islamic economics view which is highly neglected in other economic schools. Muslims’ market efficiency is therefore achieved within ethical norms and avoids any kind of efficiency loss or market failure.
خلاصه ماشینی:
Of course, the subject of this article is not to explain all factors of market failure, but rather, due to the special role of the time element in transaction contracts, it only addresses cases where the ambiguity and uncertainty of the time element cause information asymmetry, violating the efficiency of the Muslim market and leading to its failure.
Then, by examining several fundamental cases of transaction contracts based on Imami jurisprudence, it will be shown how the manifest religion of Islam has predicted precise solutions to provide a basis for information transparency regarding transactions in the Muslim market, so that transactions can take place within a framework of symmetric information between the contracting parties and within the framework of the fundamental principles of transaction validity.
In this article, an attempt has been made to show, by providing specific and documented examples of contractual transactions, that in Islamic economics, wherever a contract is concluded in ignorance leading to risk and gharar—and specifically in long-term transactions where the element of time is considered one of the pillars of the contract—if the timing of the contract is unspecified or ambiguous in a way that causes information asymmetry, the validity of such transactions is voided to prevent the occurrence of market failure for Muslims.
943), which due to the breadth of the subject, only the discussion of asymmetric information will be examined in this article and presented as an interdisciplinary discussion regarding what role the element of time plays in Islamic contracts and information symmetry in the Muslim market, which by determining it can lead to market efficiency.
(
, 
, 
)
