چکیده:
In "network realism", the world of what there is is stratified. The worlds of matter, mind, Imagination, Intellect, and Divinity are in in conformity with one another. Beings in the material world have a higher existence in those worlds. Knowing them is always "window-like". Mental knowledge of things with quiddity is realistic, but of those with no quiddity is unrealistic, illusory, untrue, and apparition. Sensible perceptions, intuitions, self-evident conceptual knowledge, and the speculative knowledge we can directly trace back to the self-evident one are all true and realistic. Nonetheless, the speculative knowledge that we cannot directly traced back to the self-evident one is untrue and illusory; it expresses a mere "apparition" of reality. Accordingly, compiled sciences, being speculative knowledge that we cannot directly traced back to the self-evident one, depend on language, are aligned with conceptual and mentally-constructed knowledge and only show an apparition of reality; in general, they are semi-realistic, "similar to reality" or "closer to reality". The errors of "networked realism" are rooted in: the confusion between knowing the worlds and knowing the stratified different realties of the material world, the belief that induction does not produce knowledge for they missed to spot the induction based on essential characteristics of things, the belief that the knowledge of things with quiddity is realistic and that of those without quiddity is unrealistic, and that they assume perceptions that depend on language and lingual and conceptual considerations illusory and untrue.
خلاصه ماشینی:
Codified knowledge, based on the fact that they are theoretical acquisitive sciences that do not lead directly to axioms, are language-dependent, and are also considered among conceptual and conventional cognitions, show a specter of reality and are generally representational; meaning they are "resembling reality" and "closer to reality.
" The foundation of the errors of "network realism" lies in confusing the cognition of realms with the cognition of different layers of the realities of the material world, in the false belief that induction and experience are not scientific, in neglecting induction based on the intrinsic properties of the object, in the belief in the representational nature of beings with essence and the non-representational nature of beings without essence, and in considering perceptions dependent on language and linguistic and conceptual conventions as illusory and virtual.
Similarly, this previous claim—that perceptions derived from the essence of material and physical beings (primary intelligibles) are representational, while perceptions derived from non-essential matters (logical and philosophical secondary intelligibles) are non-representational, virtual, and phantoms—is in conflict with this claim that, in addition to sensory and present perceptions, it considers self-evident acquisitive perceptions and theoretical perceptions leading to axioms—which are language-dependent and conceptual perceptions—to be real and representational knowledges.
On this basis, since induction is based on the causality of the essential properties of the object, they considered science (truthful scientific propositions) to be a disclosure of reality.
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