چکیده:
Baruch Spinoza, the rationalist philosopher of the seventeenth century, devoted special attention to knowledge and epistemology. In his philosophy, knowledge has types and classes, the most valid of which is intuitive knowledge, and from this point of view, he focused on intuition, its objects, and its features. This paper, studying the types of cognition in Spinoza’s thought, attempts to explain its meaning and the object. Furthermore, the article, based on two sorts of interpretations, shows that, in the development of Spinoza’s philosophy, the object of intuition changes. This variation is caused by passing Spinoza’s thought from the division of knowledge, based on the form in the TRE, to that division, based on content in Ethics and there are serious debates among interpreters about that. In both works, Spinoza’s intuition is inferential, immediate, and irregular. Although, in TRE, its object is attribute and mode, while in Ethics, it is only mode or the essence of a particular thing. Finally, we show that the realization of intuitive knowledge guarantees credible and efficient knowledge and leads to liberty and happiness as the main purpose of Spinoza's philosophy.
خلاصه ماشینی:
The second group of commentators, meaning those who believe in the consistency of Spinoza's perception of intuition, argue that Spinoza's view regarding cognition and its types has not undergone a significant change in his various works, and his original books are, from this perspective, merely different versions of a single thought.
On this basis, the present essay, while explaining the rupture in Spinoza's thought regarding the types of cognition, will seek on one hand to clarify the concept of intuition in his view and, on the other hand, will introduce the change in the object of intuitive cognition as the most important consequence of the discussed rupture.
In the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, Spinoza speaks of "all the ways of attainment that I have previously used without hesitation to confirm or reject anything" and in the Ethics, he considers the division of types of cognition as a division of the ways in which we "apprehend things and form universal concepts" (Curley, 1973: pp.
The importance of the discussion of intuition in Spinoza's thought lies in the fact that "intuitive knowledge (among the types of cognition) is the only case where we can claim that it can have universal validity" (Goestschel, 2004: p.
Spinoza's intended intuition (if it is indeed presented in the book Ethics) is completely distinct from the abstract and rational intuitive cognitions of philosophers before him, who generally focused on grasping universal matters, because it is directed toward the particular.